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Abstract 
This paper considers the nature of competition between national brands and store brands 
(otherwise known as private label or own label goods). We expound an analytical framework that 
allows for both price and non-price (quality) competition and use this to see how these different 
forms of rivalry interact in a setting where a leading retailer offering a store brand acts as both a 
customer and competitor to a national brand producer.  This relationship thus entails both 
vertical and horizontal competition.  We show that generally the retailer will seek to position its 
store brand as closely as possible to the national brand, by seeking to minimise the quality gap, 
but price the two goods very differently, with a wide price gap, as a means to segment consumers. 
Store brand introduction can lead to overall higher prices, so be against consumers’ interest, 
unless there is intense head-to-head rivalry for value-conscious consumers.  Intense rivalry is 
more likely to happen if the national brand producer can exercise some control over its own 
product’s retail price (e.g. by being allowed to use maximum resale price maintenance) and has 
protection against copycat (lookalike) store brands ensuring a degree of differentiation between 
the competing products.  Accordingly, we suggest that there are horizontal competition benefits 
on top of the usual vertical (alleviating double marginalisation) and intellectual property (to 
encourage brand investments) reasons to support respectively a more lenient policy stance 
towards RPM and a tougher stance against parasitic copycatting. The mix of horizontal and 
vertical aspects has important implications for undertaking market definition analysis in CPG 
markets, and specifically testing whether store brands and national brands are in the same 
product market.  We highlight the considerable care needed in applying and interpreting the 
usual price and demand elasticity analysis used in market definition tests because of how 
segmentation and item-by-item retail pricing can distort demand and sales patterns. 
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1. Introduction 
Store brands – also known as private label or own label goods – are ubiquitous.  They are an 
important feature of most sectors of modern retailing, ranging from apparel to home furnishing, 
DIY to electrical appliances, books to jewellery, pharmacy to financial services (Kumar and 
Steenkamp 2007).  Indeed, they feature in almost every domain where retail store chains have 
become the dominant means of retail distribution and where consumers have built up a 
relationship to the extent that the retailers are viewed as brands in their own right, enabling them 
to commission and market products bearing their own store name or a registered exclusive brand 
name to compete alongside established producer-managed national brands.   
The success and prevalence of store brands is nowhere more apparent than in the consumer 
packaged goods (CPG) sector – or otherwise called the fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) 
sector – with frequently purchased, low involvement, low cost food and non-food goods sold 
through supermarkets, mass merchandisers, discounters and drug stores.  In the US, store brands 
sales through such outlets amounted to $112bn in 2013, representing 17.5% of sales in these 
channels (PLMA 2014a).  In Europe, though, the market shares held by such store brands are 
typically much higher; over 40% by value in Switzerland, Spain and the UK, and averaging over 
30% across EU countries (PLMA 2014b). Globally, store brands’ market share has been increasing 
over time and represents around 15% of CPG sales (Nielsen 2011; Tristram 2014). 
The emergence of store brands as an important feature of most consumer goods markets might 
appear as an obvious welcome development, not least for value-conscious consumers seeking an 
alternative to branded goods and for new suppliers able to compete without the normal risks and 
capital associated with having to develop and market producer brands.  However, the overall 
impact on market outcomes from the increasing presence of store brands is not clear cut.  For 
consumers, if store brands add to (rather than replace) existing products and thus increase 
product choice then this might generally be welcomed, but this does not necessarily entail lower 
prices and does not necessarily mean that the goods that they would ideally like are available, e.g. 
if their favourite brands are replaced by store brands or producers are less willing to make 
investments in improving quality or develop new products.  Much depends on how competition 
is affected within the supply chain and whether store brands stimulate competition in a positive 
way or they lessen and/or distort competition in a detrimental way.  This requires a careful 
understanding of how national brands and store brands compete, which is the focus of this paper. 
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With modern supply chains characterised by consolidation and concentration amongst both 
producers and retailers, driven by the need for efficiency and the growth of more successful 
businesses at the expense of weaker ones, it is possible that markets which have both strong 
national brands and strong store brands might offer the best of both worlds.  Steiner (2004) 
argues that such a “mixed regimen” situation is where competition is at its most intense as brand 
producers fight to maintain their market positions through investing in product developments, 
innovation and marketing while having to be competitive on their supply prices as store brands 
try to compete through price and seeking to match quality.  However, Steiner accepts this can be 
a delicate balance and it might tip one way, where one side ends up dominating, or the firms find 
ways to avoid intense competition (with the suggestion that information sharing and influence 
through category captaincy could facilitate collusion).   
Nevertheless, we should not assume that effective competition simply relies on the dynamic of 
horizontal competitive pressure between a producer-controlled national brand and a retailer-
controlled store brand, each vying for increasing their respective market share at the other’s 
expense, just as with any other competitive relationship.  Producer competition here necessarily 
involves trading with a distributor (as their customer) to reach final consumers.  In this case, 
though, it is the very same retailer commissioning and controlling the store brand that is also 
retailing it and equally the same retailer buying and then reselling the national brand.  The 
complexity of the relationship is because there is both a horizontal element to competition at the 
product level (and the battle for market share) and a vertical element to competition in trading 
between successive stages of the supply chain (and the battle for profit share).   
These twin elements can give a retailer considerable power over a national brand producer when 
it holds both a gatekeeper position as an essential route for the producer to go through to reach 
final consumers and as the controller of the selling environment in which products are retailed to 
consumers.  In this case, the retailer has all the in-store marketing levers at its disposal in 
determining which products to stock, how much shelf space to allocate to them, where precisely 
to position them, how much in-store promotion and attention to give them  (including banners 
and shelf talkers), and how they are priced (in both a relative and absolute sense).  The retailer 
will clearly adjust these levers to suit its own interests, and that could well mean favouring its 
store brands over national brands.  However, it would only do so if such action were profitable 
and it had some degree of discretion, e.g. because retail competitors were behaving in a similar 
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way in trying to promote higher-margin store brands and consumers were willing to accept or 
not notice such behaviour (perhaps of a more subtle rather blatant nature).   
By contrast, and without the retailer’s in-store promotional support, the national brand producer 
can only exert indirect influence over consumers by how attractive it makes its products and how 
well it advertises and promotes them (e.g. with coupons) to arouse consumers’ interest and 
create demand.  In many instances, pioneering national brands have opened up and created whole 
new product categories, only for others including store brands to follow later.  However, the 
worry for national brand producers in undertaking such innovation is that they will not be able 
to fully reap the rewards of their risky investments when store brands can simply mimic them 
and replace them.  This is particularly the fear with “lookalikes” which go beyond me-too similar 
products to being blatant copycats plagiarising the brand’s trade dress and then potentially 
misleading or even deceiving consumers.1  Yet, there is a more general concern that store brands 
are often followers, using a second-mover advantage to free-ride on national brands’ product 
design and marketing investments and then favoured in-store by retailers as their owners at the 
expense of national brands.2  Moreover, these concerns are not just a matter for intellectual 
property law but they are intrinsically a competition law matter because of the way rivalry may 
be restricted or distorted in the marketplace to have an adverse impact on consumers.   
Even so, national brands continue to perform well and typically outsell store brands in a wide 
range of product categories.  While store brand share is generally increasing across countries its 
penetration rate varies quite significantly across product categories and types of retailers.  The 
categories where store brands tend to hold high market shares are for commodity-type products 
which have little differentiation such as fresh food (fruit, vegetables, meat and fish), food staples 
(like eggs, milk and related dairy produce) and non-food commodities (like bleach), or where 
retail service is important such as freshly baked bread or delicatessen goods served by sales 
assistants.  However, store brands’ shares tend to be low where strong national brands 
predominate in categories when there is considerable scope for differentiation and 
distinctiveness (e.g. alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages), where product trust and reliability is 
                                                          
1  Public policy to deal suitably with this matter remains under debate.  For instance, the UK government is 
currently reviewing the enforcement provisions of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 in respect of copycat packaging (https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ 
consumer-protection-copycat-packaging-call-for-evidence). 
2 Dobson and Chakraborty (2009) provide examples and illustrations of these aspects and discuss the 
different roles that national brands and store brands can play in supporting or hindering consumers’ choice 
and welfare.  
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vital (e.g. baby food, diapers and tampons), or where product quality, formulation or design is not 
easy to match (e.g. cola, instant coffee and razor blades).  Also, there is quite wide variation in the 
extent and emphasis that different retailers place on their store brand portfolios.  Some retailers 
operate almost entirely relying on store brands (e.g. Aldi and Marks & Spencer) but most retailers 
operate with a mix of store brands and national brands, with some evenly split and others pushing 
in this direction.3 
Over time, consumer acceptance of CPG store brands has increased and store brand ranges have 
spread across all main product categories.  Moreover, the quality gap with national brands 
appears to have closed quite significantly in terms of performance (e.g. as tested by consumer 
bodies) as well as in terms of perception, as the negative stigma about store brands as cheap 
inferior alternatives has given way to an appreciation that they can offer a genuine quality-
equivalent alternative as well as being innovative in their own right (e.g. with premium and 
gourmet store brands).4  Nevertheless, there continues to be a marked price gap with national 
brands generally carrying a significantly higher retail price than corresponding store brands.  
This price gap averages around 20% in the US and 30% in Europe (slightly lower in countries like 
the UK, Netherlands and Italy, while higher in the likes of Germany, France and Greece).   The 
price gap also varies across product categories, tending to be lower in categories like chilled and 
fresh food, ambient food and frozen food while higher for alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks, 
confectionery and personal care, and more mixed for household and pet food (IRI 2013). 
Accordingly, we observe quite a mixed picture, where store brand penetration rates vary 
according to the country, category, and retailer and while store brand quality is seemingly close 
to that of national brands a wide price gap generally persists.5  Nevertheless, the march of store 
brands appears relentless.  Retailers have over time expanded their ranges and moved into 
operating multiple tiers of store brands, such as providing consumers with a three-tier choice of 
“economy-standard-premium” marketed as “good-better-best”, as well as other variants targeted 
                                                          
3 For instance, the big six UK supermarket chains (i.e. Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s, Morrisons, Waitrose and 
the Co-operative) operate with a generally close to even split in the range 42-53% (Spary 2014).  In the US, 
with the exception of Aldi and its subsidiary Trader Joe’s, retailers’ store brand shares tend to be lower but 
growing (Peckenpaugh 2013; Hale 2014).  
4 Boyle and Lathrop (2013) provide a review and synthesis of the US evidence on increasing store brand 
quality.  Consumer Reports magazine scores private label and national brands on their performance (e.g. 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2013/10/best-store-brands/index.htm). In the UK, 
Which? provides a similar service.  However, for a very extensive range of assessments of the quality of UK 
store brands compared to national brands, see http://www.supermarketownbrandguide.co.uk.  
5 Sethuraman and Gielens (2014) provide a review of the different factors affecting store brand share. 
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at different consumer segments (e.g. “healthy”, “organic”, and “free from”).  These sub-categories 
are expected to grow, but most sales will still be through mainstream standard me-too store 
brands.6  However, the growth of store brands is expected to increasingly squeeze secondary (“B”) 
brands rather than the market leading (“A”) national brands.  Inevitably, this will lead to 
categories becoming increasingly polarised with consumers’ options restricted to a dichotomous 
choice between the leading national brand or a store brand (Rabobank 2011). 
Given the enormous size of the CPG sector affecting essentially every consumer, how competition 
plays out in the sector is critically important for consumer and societal welfare.  Ideally, there 
should be vigorous competition that provides the range and quality of products to satisfy 
consumers’ needs and at keen prices.  But with increasingly polarised consumer choice and high 
degrees of concentration at both producer and retailer levels, how sure can we be that 
competition will deliver such benefits?    
This paper explores this issue through analytical modelling to provide insights on how national 
brands and store brands compete and then to consider the implications for industry participants 
and the consumers they serve as well as for the regulators and policymakers who oversee and 
promote competition in the sector.  We model this competition at its most core level by 
considering the dual cooperative-yet-competitive relationship between a single leading national 
brand producer and a single leading retailer, dominant in their respective markets.   We take 
account of the above described features of such markets, which allow for different consumer 
segments and different individual preferences supporting the presence of both a national brand 
and a store brand.  In particular, we are interested to see how price and non-price competition 
interact, and particularly how store brand quality is determined relative to that of national brand 
quality and the consequences for resulting prices in the market.  Will the store brand seek to 
position itself differently or the same as the national brand in terms of quality?  Which is better 
for consumers?   
In addressing these questions, we are particularly concerned about the robustness of any findings 
so we allow for different degrees of channel control and influence over price setting, ranging from 
this being national brand producer-led to retailer-led as well as more balanced control.   However, 
                                                          
6 Multi-tier and multi-variant store brand portfolios are most advanced in the UK, but even here standard-
level store brands continue to account for over three-quarters of all store brand sales amongst the leading 
grocery retailers (Spary 2014). In other countries, standard store brands remain dominant over 
subcategories (e.g. IGD 2013). 
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a general finding emerges across the range of scenarios considered.  We find that the retailer will 
seek to position its store brand as closely as possible to match the quality of the national brand 
but that a large price gap may still prevail between the two products.  This occurs because the 
retailer prefers to use the two products to achieve self-targeted consumer segmentation, by 
pricing the national brand high so it appeals and sells only to brand loyal consumers while 
pitching the store brand at a sufficient discount to capture consumers prepared to switch into 
buying the seemingly better value store brand.  There are exceptions, such as when the retailer is 
restricted in its ability to match national brand quality or where the brand loyal segment is so 
small that the national brand is encouraged to fight for value-sensitive consumers.  However, the 
segmentation outcome generally prevails for most market conditions examined.  Furthermore, 
this is not necessarily a beneficial outcome for consumers and can lead to overall higher prices.  
At the heart of the analysis lies the question of what a retailer can gain from developing a store 
brand to compete with the national brand. In essence, what advantage does the store brand 
provide the retailer?  As we show, it can be an instrument to curb a national brand producer’s 
channel power, obliging it to offer lower supply prices to the retailer.  However, it can also provide 
the retailer with a tool to price discriminate with consumers self-targeting through their product 
selection, taking advantage of differences in consumers when some are prejudiced against store 
brands while others are not.  In this sense, the retailer is very much in the ilk of Salop’s (1977) 
“noisy monopolist” using the quality-equivalent store brand and spurious differentiation as a 
means to price discriminate between brand loyal and brand switcher consumers by selling the 
national branded product at a high price to brand loyal consumers and the store brand at a low 
price to switcher consumers, compared to selling only the branded product at an intermediate 
price to both consumer types.7 
Does this mean that national brands and store brands do not actually compete?  No, they still 
compete in both non-price (quality) and price terms, but it is important to understand how each 
constrains the other when it is the retailer that sets the prices of both products (and so controls 
the price gap) and it sets the store brand’s quality relative to that of the national brand (and so 
controls the quality gap).  The retailer’s objective here is to maximise its own profit so it will set 
prices and relative quality in a way that suits its own interests, even if this gives rise to channel 
conflict with the national brand producer, which can suffer from its demand being choked off by 
                                                          
7  This argument and related analysis also features in Ward et al (2002), Perloff et al (2006; 2012) and 
Gabrielsen et al (2006), while Soberman and Parker (2004; 2006) reach similar conclusions. 
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its high retail price and losing sales to a copycat store brand pitched at a lower price.  In this case, 
it might be better from a societal perspective to let the national brand producer be able to dictate 
or at least cap its own retail price.  Prevailing policy has been very much against allowing 
producers to practice resale price maintenance (RPM), but we consider whether in this setting 
competition authorities might want to take a more lenient approach.  We also consider whether 
public policy to restrict store brands copycatting national brands might also encourage more 
direct price competition.   
Beyond these two policy matters, our analysis also raises other important questions for 
competition authorities, notably in respect of market definition analysis, which could be 
important in merger cases or industry inquiries. In other market contexts, where independent 
competitors each set their own prices and non-price variables, examining price gaps and price 
correlations, as well as demand patterns and diversion ratios, can be quite telling about the extent 
to which products are substitutes and whether they are in the same or different economic 
markets.  However, given that prices are not independently set here and corresponding non-price 
decisions made in a manner that could intentionally segment consumers, the application of 
standard market definition analysis should be undertaken with considerable care.  We discuss 
this matter and highlight where difficulties might arise and why incorrect conclusions might be 
drawn, particularly in considering store brands as being in separate economic markets to national 
brands. 
In all of this analysis and discussion, we are conscious that this is a complex subject and that no 
simple model can do full justice to the intricacies and multifaceted nature of competition in 
modern CPG markets.  In explaining and developing our model, we carefully consider the 
assumptions being made and discuss their implications and alternatives.  In this way, we hope 
that we are being as transparent as possible about the model and the interpretation and 
applicability of the findings, but also we are seeking to be helpful in suggesting where extensions 
and further lines of enquiry could be developed.  This is a particularly rich topic and we hope that 
the present paper stimulates further analytical work as well as a deeper consideration and 
appreciation of the public policy issues.  While the empirical work is large in this field and 
analytical work is flourishing, we are conscious that much more work is needed on public policy 
aspects as well as providing guidance for regulators and competition authorities and we hope 
that the present paper fills part of this void.   
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  In the next section we set out our analytical 
framework, relating this to the existing research literature and picking up the key themes in the 
subsequent analysis, while setting out the model’s assumption on consumer demand, firms’ 
revenues and costs, and the structure and timing of decisions.   In Section 3, we examine the 
market outcomes in the absence of a store brand, where only a national brand is available to cater 
for consumers’ needs.  In Section 4, we examine outcomes where the retailer introduces a store 
brand to compete with the national brand, distinguishing between the situation where there is 
market segmentation with the national brand targeted to brand loyal customers and the store 
brand targeted at brand switcher consumers and the situation where both products compete 
head-to-head for switcher consumers.  In Section 5, we derive the equilibrium market outcomes, 
determining the store brand quality that the retailer will want to set relative to that of the national 
brand and the resulting equilibrium prices.  In Section 6, we discuss the implications of our 
findings for industry participants, consumers, regulators, policymakers and competition 
authorities.  Section 7 concludes the paper with a summary of the findings and suggestions for 
further areas of research. 
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2. Model Set-Up 
2.1 Literature context 8 
Our interest centres on the relationship and interaction between a leading national brand 
producer and a leading retailer where there is a tension between the need to cooperate for the 
sake of their complementary roles as a producer and a distributor to create value by supplying 
goods to consumers and yet compete for how this value (i.e. profit) is shared. This tension is 
present in any supply chain trading relationship.  However, the added element of tension with the 
presence of a retailer-controlled store brand is that the retailer is not only a competitor for a 
national brand producer in a vertical sense over profits as a customer (i.e. at successive stages of 
the supply chain) but also as a competitor in a horizontal sense as a direct rival supplier (i.e. at the 
same stage of the supply chain), so affording the retailer a double agent role (Bell et al 1997; 
Dobson 1998, 2005).   This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 – Supply Chain Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 This section has benefited by being able to draw on a number of very useful survey articles, including 
Bergès-Sennou et al (2004), Sayman and Raju (2007), Pauwels and Srinivasan (2009), Sethuraman (2009), 
Hyman et al (2010), Sethuraman and Raju (2012) and Sethuraman and Gielens (2014), which helpfully 
summarise and put into context what has now become a large literature on theoretical and empirical 
analysis of store brands and private labels.  
Brand Private Label
Retailer
Consumers
Retailer 
control
Horizontal Competition
Vertical
Competition
Figure 1 – Supply Chain Competition
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How this tension and rivalry plays out is of interest not just in terms of how it affects the division 
of profits but how it affects outcomes for the supply chain and the market as a whole, and not 
least for consumers.  Potentially, consumers have much to gain from the presence of store brands 
by adding to their choice set and spurring increased producer price competition (e.g. Mills 1995), 
but not necessarily if the benefits simply flow to the retailer and provide it with greater means of 
control over consumers, such as enhancing its ability to price discriminate (e.g. Soberman and 
Parker 2006).  Indeed, the empirical evidence on the effect of the presence of store brands on 
overall prices is mixed. 9   More generally, what is even less well understood is how the 
combination of price and non-price competition is affected by these mixed vertical-horizontal 
relationships, which is the key theme of this paper. 
Our aim here is to try to provide some clarity or at least general insights on the precise nature of 
the competitive relationship between national brands and store brands.  This is necessarily a 
complex subject matter and our model does not seek to cover all aspects and angles.  Notably, we 
couch our analysis in a very simple market structure which focuses on just a single national brand 
producer and a single retailer, so abstracts from the strategic considerations of other players like 
rival brand producers and rival retailers.  Much recent research has focused on more complex 
market structures, and this has produced many fresh insights.10   However, at issue here is to try 
to gain a more robust perspective on the one-to-one relationship between a leading brand 
producer and a leading brand retailer by considering a wide range of pricing arrangements, 
allowing for different extremes that might conceivably characterise how market prices are set at 
the wholesale and retail level.   
In particular, as evident from Sethuraman’s (2009) examination of the validity of analytical 
results from national brand and store brand competition models, the decision structure in these 
models is invariably of one type, namely Stackelberg leadership with sequential producer-then-
retailer pricing, where producers make take-it-or-leave-it offers or negotiate wholesale prices 
                                                          
9 Some studies find brand prices increasing in response to store brand new entry, e.g. Kim and Parker 
(1999), Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004), and Ward et al (2002). For a review, see Sethuraman (2009). 
10 For instance, competition amongst different brand manufacturers allows for consideration of which 
national brand the store brand might seek to replace (e.g. Scott Morten and Zettelmeyer 2004; Sachon and 
de Albeniz 2009) or mimic (e.g. Sayman et al 2002).  In addition, competition amongst different retailers 
allows for consideration of how store brands might be used to build store loyalty and soften competition 
through lack of direct price comparability (e.g. Corstjens and Lal 2000). 
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and then retailers unilaterally set retail prices.11  There are few models which employ different 
timings of moves, whether simultaneous or retailer-then-producer price setting,12 but at real 
issue is who has control in the trading relationship and the extent to which a party has influence 
over the other party’s own price.  Specifically, we will be considering situations ranging from the 
two opposite extremes where the brand producer has full control not just of its own NB wholesale 
price but also the brand’s retail price, against the other extreme where the retailer has complete 
control over not just the brand’s retail price but also its wholesale price, as well as the 
intermediate situation where each party independently controls its own price.  As will be seen, 
this allows for consideration of an unusually wide set of market outcomes, but of particular 
pertinence will be the common findings in providing some assurance about their broad 
applicability and generality. 
As well as accommodating the need for a wide array of different pricing arrangements in the 
market, the central purpose of the paper is to give consideration to the interaction of price and 
non-price competition between national brands and store brands.  In particular, our main focus 
will be on a retailer’s strategic positioning of a store brand in quality terms relative to a national 
brand and how this affects prices and choice in the market.  To this end, we are mindful of the 
need to adopt a consumer demand set-up that can readily account for the joint presence of both 
a national brand and a store brand but is sufficiently versatile in allowing for considerable 
modelling flexibility with a simple parameterised structure.  In this regard, our characterisation 
of consumer demand adopts the neat and intuitive formulation by Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2007), 
which marries together the notion of two distinct consumer segments with one brand loyal and 
the other prepared to switch products (e.g. Narasinham and Wilcox 1998; Corstjens and Lal 2000; 
Soberman and Parker 2004, 2006; Perloff et al 2012) and consumers differing in their individual 
willingness to trade off price against quality when making value-for-money product selections 
(e.g. Mills 1995, 1999; Bontems et al 1999; Bergès-Sennou and Waterson 2005; Heese 2010; 
Groznik and Heese 2010a; Fousekis 2010).  However, our focus is very different to theirs as we 
address both product quality and pricing decisions to analyse a wide set of conceivable vertical 
and horizontal customer/competitor interactions.  In particular, our emphasis is on actual and 
not just potential direct competition between a national brand and a store brand so that, rather 
                                                          
11 However, there are models which allow for greater scope than simple linear (wholesale-price-only) 
contracts to consider non-linear (e.g. two-part tariff or share of profits) contracts and other negotiated 
terms. For a recent example with comments on the extant literature, see Johansen (2012). 
12 A notable exception is Choi and Fredj (2013) examining a range of different timing sequences, but their 
focus is solely on price competition and they do not examine non-price competition addressed here.  
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than giving consideration to contracts that exclude competition, we are primarily interested in 
how vertical and horizontal competition may manifest itself between a national brand and a store 
brand and the strategic role that product quality and pricing decisions play in determining market 
outcomes. 
In modelling consumer demand, we utilise an address model approach (i.e. which explicitly 
models consumers preferences in product characteristics space) in terms of discrete choices (buy 
one unit of a good or buy nothing) made by a spectrum of individual consumers differing in terms 
of their individual taste preferences for product quality, i.e. a vertical differentiation set-up in the 
tradition of Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton 
(1982).  This framework suits our context where we are looking at consumers making a purchase 
decision in a single product category, where the products are sold in indivisible units (e.g. a 500g 
packet or 1lt bottle) and where consumers share the same view on the products’ quality ranking 
but can differ in their willingness to pay for quality and where they are only looking to purchase 
one unit of one good.  Nevertheless, the literature on store brands and private labels has used 
other approaches, including address models built on horizontal differentiation where consumers 
hold different views over quality rankings which might be suitable for when competing products 
are very different in their features, e.g. Soberman and Parker 2006 and Richards et al 2010, or a 
combination of horizontal and vertical differentiation when allowing for retail competition, e.g. 
Groznik and Heese 2010b and Liao and Yano 2013.  In addition, yet other papers take a non-
address approach (where product characteristics are left unspecified) looking at aggregate 
demand or where a representative consumer purchases a bundle of imperfectly substitutable 
goods which can be useful for an aggregate or sector-wide perspective, e.g. Raju et al 1995, 
Cotterill and Putsis 2000, Sayman et al 2002, Choi and Coughlan 2006, and Choi and Fredj 2013. 
Much of the relevant literature treats the store brand’s position as exogenously given, leaving the 
focus to be primarily about price competition.  However, there are a number of papers like ours 
which provide formal modelling of how the store brand might be best positioned for the retailer’s 
benefit.  The findings generally point to the retailer best positioning the store brand close to the 
national brand.  Four key reasons emerge.  First, competitively supplied store brands offer the 
retailer higher margins so it is inclined to try to shift sales towards the store brands and away 
from the national brands, and so gain higher profits in the process, e.g. Raju et al (1995).13  Second, 
                                                          
13 There are a large number of studies showing that percentage margins tend to be higher on private label 
goods, e.g. Hoch and Banerji (1993), Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998), Raju et al. (1995), Barsky et al. (2001), 
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closer competition makes the national brand less indispensable for generating high channel 
profits and so weakens its bargaining position vis-à-vis the retailer, e.g. Mills 1995 and Scott-
Morten and Zettelmeyer (2004).14  Third, high quality store brands help build customer store 
loyalty so soften retail competition, e.g. Corstjens and Lal (2000).15  Fourth, creating high quality 
store brands in one product category could offer revenue synergies through a reputational benefit 
encouraging trial and store brand acceptance in other categories, e.g. Sayman and Raju (2004).16  
As we limit our attention to a single product category and a single retailer, our primary interest 
will be in the first two of these reasons. 
Nevertheless, and despite these good reasons for positioning the store brand close to the national 
brand, there are also reasons why the retailer might prefer a more differentiated position.  First, 
differentiation might allow store brands to serve different (e.g. value-conscious) consumers more 
effectively compared to national brands focused on the needs of other (e.g. quality-conscious) 
consumers, thereby allowing the retailer greater opportunity to segment and price discriminate 
amongst consumer types (Soberman and Parker 2006). Second, the store brand might want to 
position away from national brands when they are largely undifferentiated and already in intense 
head-to-head competition amongst themselves or prepared to fight aggressively to serve their 
existing customer base, say by the store brand offering different product features (Choi and 
Coughlan 2006).  Third, if it is costly to imitate the quality and features of national brands then 
taking a differentiated position for a store brand might be more cost-effective and offer higher 
profit margins (e.g. Bontems et al 1999).  Fourth, positioning the store brand close to national 
brand might trigger a strategic response that either escalates costs or weakens category demand, 
e.g. a cost escalation with the national brand trying to keep its distance from the store brand by 
improving quality and adding further features (Heese 2010) or reduced brand investment effort 
                                                          
Sayman et al (2002), Pauwel and Srinivasan (2004), and Steiner (2004, 2009), but the counter is that 
absolute (dollar/euro) margins can be lower, e.g. Corstjens and Lal (2000) and Ailawadi and Harlam (2004). 
14 Empirical evidence also supports this view showing the introduction or growing presence of private label 
can allow the retailer to obtain lower wholesale prices on brands, e.g. Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998), 
Sayman et al (2002), Ailawadi and Harlam (2004), or better trade deals from brand suppliers, e.g. Lal 
(1990). 
15 For supporting evidence, see Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) and Ailawadi et al (2008). 
16 Sayman and Raju (2004) find support for such an “umbrella” effect where the number and sales of private 
label products in other product categories increase the sales of the private label item in the target category.  
Consistent with this motive and retailers’ attempts to maximize private label share at the category level, 
Chintagunta (2002) finds private label prices to be set lower than category profit-maximising prices.  
Similarly, Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) suggest that loyalty and differentiation benefits for the retailer 
arising from private label are linked to the breadth of the private label range. 
14 
 
in advertising and product improvements causing market demand to contract or not reach its full 
potential (Sethuraman 2004).17 Our primary interest will again be in the first two of these reasons 
but we do consider the other two as well.  
Accordingly, the analytical framework we have in mind is one that is tractable [and we are able 
here to derive straightforward exact (closed-form) solutions for ease of comparison rather than 
needing to rely on simulations] and yet allows for a broad consideration of the mix and interplay 
of price and non-price competition between a national brand and store brand serving 
heterogeneous consumers.  In particular, we are conscious of the need to examine the robustness 
of findings by allowing for a wide range of different pricing scenarios representing different 
degrees of channel control because of their potential to have significant influence on the strength 
of competing tensions, like whether the store brand should be positioned closely or differently to 
the national brand, whether it should be priced aggressively or softly, and whether it should be 
targeted at the same or different consumers.  Importantly, we do find consistent results and these 
are helpful in discussing the implications for firms, consumers and regulators. 
2.2. Outline of Model 
To fix ideas, we focus on a product category sold by a retailer which holds a leading market 
position in the downstream market, e.g. a local monopolist.  There is a single leading brand 
producer which sells a national brand (NB) in this product category and the retailer has the option 
of distributing the national brand exclusively or can introduce its own store brand (SB) to 
compete for sales with the national brand.  Competition arises for the NB producer by the threat 
or actual presence of the store brand, which is assumed to be supplied by a third party under 
perfectly competitive conditions and so supplied to the retailer at its marginal cost of production.  
The retailer does not face direct retailer competition but does so indirectly by virtue of its 
customers having a maximum willingness to pay (i.e. reservation price) before they go elsewhere 
to buy their goods.   This outside option for consumers can be thought of in terms of there being 
an alternative distribution channel which normally would not compete for same type of shoppers 
(e.g. a choice of perfectly competitive independent convenience stores serving consumers’ top-
                                                          
17 As Dobson and Chakraborty (2009) discuss, how a brand producer responds to store brands mimicking 
its position will depend on its ability to maintain its distance and the extent to which it can appropriate its 
brand investments to limit the extent to which store brands simply free-ride on these investments.  For a 
range of possible brand producer responses to the threat of store brands, see Mills (1999), Du et al (2005), 
Kumar and Steenkamp (2007), and Nasser et al (2013). 
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up-shopping needs as compared to a dominant hypermarket chain store operator serving 
consumers’ one-stop-shopping needs).  In this way we abstract from the strategic consideration 
of other players in the supply chain to focus solely on the interaction between the two key trading 
parties.  Clearly, we are cognisant that this simple structure loses some of the sophistication of 
more complex competitive settings, involving multiple interacting brand producers and retailers, 
and so narrows the set of issues that can be addressed, but as will become apparent it still allows 
for a rich set of considerations. 
To this stripped-down market structure we add two key ingredients that appear as important 
features of NB and SB interaction and explain why product categories typically cater for the 
presence of both types of goods, but which also provide different analytical ways to conceive 
product substitutability.  First, both goods serve the same general function for consumers and 
share the same general defining product characteristics (e.g. cornflakes, tomato ketchup or razor 
blades) but the two goods can be distinguished in vertical differentiation terms by their perceived 
quality, where we will assume an unambiguous quality ranking with the NB ranked as better or 
at least as good as the SB by all consumers.   To be clear, we are viewing here the SB as a “me-too” 
“standard” store brand or private label seeking to emulate the NB and not as a distinctive 
“premium” store brand, in which case a horizontal differentiation framework might be more 
appropriate, where consumers differ over their quality ranking according their individual own 
tastes and preferences.  Thus, all other things being equal, we would expect the SB price to be less 
than or at most equal to the NB price as otherwise no-one would buy the me-too SB.18  Of central 
importance to the paper will be the retailer’s quality choice of the SB, which we take as an 
endogenous choice variable rather than exogenously given.  Thus the model accounts for NB and 
SB competition in both price and non-price (quality) dimensions. 
The second critical ingredient we add is that the retailer’s customers differ fundamentally in their 
preferences for the NB and SB and form two distinct consumer segments (e.g. Narasinham and 
Wilcox (1998), Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2007), Perloff et al (2012), inter alia). One segment is 
made up of consumers who will only consider buying the NB and on no account would ever 
contemplate buying the SB, which in their eyes is an unacceptably inferior product.  These 
consumers are termed “Loyals”, because of their unstinting brand loyalty towards the NB which  
means that even if the NB is over-priced to the point of exceeding their reservation price or if it is 
                                                          
18 In contrast, prices for premium store brands can often exceed those for national brands. For examples, 
see Kumar and Steenkamp (2007, chapter 3). 
16 
 
not stocked and delisted by the retailer then they would simply go elsewhere to buy the NB (i.e. 
exercise their outside option).  The other segment is made of consumers who will consider buying 
either the NB or the SB but make their choice based on a careful consideration of their respective 
product qualities and the prices offered, selecting the one that offers them the better value for 
money for their own individual preference in trading off price against quality.  These consumers 
are termed “Switchers”, because of their willingness to switch products based on what offers 
them personally the better value.  Of importance to our analysis will be the relative sizes of these 
two segments and the range of preferences amongst the Switchers in terms of their individual 
value-for-money and willingness-to-pay preferences ranging from low-end budget conscious 
consumers to high-end quality conscious consumers. 
With these two ingredients, we can see why the retailer will desire to stock and sell the NB, 
because of its superior quality perception and because some consumers will simply not buy an 
alternative product.  Equally we can see why the retailer would be interested to introduce and 
sell an SB because it can appeal to value-conscious Switchers and give the retailer some leverage 
in its dealings with the NB producer where otherwise it would be faced with a monopoly supplier.  
Similarly, we can observe the challenge for the NB producer that it will want to maintain its 
leading position in terms of sales in the category but it will not want to be drawn into a profit-
destroying fight with the SB for the sake of maintaining sales if this simply results in diminished 
profit and instead it might want to fall back on the comfort of serving its secure base of brand 
loyal customers.  For the retailer contemplating its choice of SB quality, it will have to think 
through how its decision will affect pricing behaviour in the market and whether it is desirable to 
provoke or avoid the prospect of intense head-to-head competition between the NB and SB.  As 
will become apparent, much will depend on how retail prices are set. 
With the framework outlined, we next set out the specifics on consumer demand, the costs faced 
by the industry players, and the structure and timing of decisions and degree of channel control.  
2.3 Consumer demand 
In terms of formalising consumer demand, we assume that the shoppers at the retailer are a mix 
of Loyals and Switchers.  Each shopper buys at most one unit of an item in the product category, 
selecting between the NB and the SB (if it is available and at an acceptable quality) or buying 
nothing which offers zero utility.  Switchers are prepared to consider all three options (i.e. buy 
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the NB, buy the SB or buy nothing), and will select between the NB and SB based on which offers 
the better value subject to it meeting their individual reservation price for the given product 
quality.  In contrast, Loyals will only consider buying the NB and will do so as long as its price 
does not exceed their reservation price.  
Let pi denote the retail price of product i = 1, 2, where “1” indicates the national brand and “2” 
indicates the store brand and let 𝑠𝑖 ∈ [0,1]  serve as a quality index for each of the two goods.  
In respect of the demand from Switchers, we assume a conventional vertical differentiation set-
up with a continuum of such consumers indexed by 𝜃, uniformly distributed in the interval [𝜃, 𝜃] 
with unit density, 𝜃 − 𝜃 = 1 , and 𝜃 > 𝜃 > 0 .  The taste parameter 𝜃  represents marginal 
willingness to pay for quality and the utility of a switching consumer of type 𝜃 buying quality si at 
price pi is 
𝑉(𝜃, 𝑠𝑖) = 𝜃𝑠𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖       s. t.  𝜃~𝑈[𝜃, 𝜃],   𝜃 > 0,    𝜃 = 𝜃 + 1  
As we allow for the possibility of uncovered demand (i.e. some consumers opting not to buy 
anything from the retailer), we assume that 𝜃 is close to unity and so 𝜃 is just over zero and that 
way their ratio (i.e. 𝜃/𝜃) is high, representing a wide spread of individual tastes (Choi and Shin 
1992; Wauthy 1996; Liao 2008).19 
In contrast, there are 𝜇 Loyals, where 𝜇 ⋚ 1.  Loyals share a high willingness to pay for the NB, 
which we assume is the same taste parameter 𝜃, such that their number can be increased by 
adding consumers at the top of the taste distribution for quality.  The utility of a Loyal consumer 
buying the national brand is 
𝑉(𝜃, 𝑠1) = 𝜃𝑠1 − 𝑝1 
To reduce the notation, we normalise the NB quality to unity (𝑠1 = 1), and we denote 𝑠2 = 𝑠 as 
the SB quality. We assume 𝑠 ≤ 1, so that SB quality cannot exceed that of the NB, but generally we 
will be considering the situation where the SB is a lower quality than the NB, i.e. 𝑠 < 1, but look 
to see what happens as the quality gap, 1 − 𝑠, narrows and in the limit the SB becomes an exact 
match in quality terms to the NB, i.e.  𝑠 → 1.  Accordingly, the NB is the benchmark in quality terms, 
positioned at the highest feasible quality level, for which the SB has to measure itself against.  
                                                          
19 For instance, Wauthy (1996) shows that with no costs of quality – which we will be assuming – the 
uncovered demand outcomes are supported as sub-game perfect equilibrium outcomes when 𝜃/𝜃 >
8.6581.  With fixed costs of quality, Liao (2008) finds the requirement to be 𝜃/𝜃 > 4.7226. 
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Implicitly we are assuming that for historical reasons the NB has moved first and committed to 
its quality level and then built its brand reputation around that quality level, leaving the SB as a 
second mover for the retailer to decide how close or distant it wants to position the SB quality 
relative to that of the NB.  In such circumstances, and assuming that the costs associated with the 
quality choice have been already covered (i.e. past sunk costs rather than ongoing variable costs 
in nature), then the vertical differentiation set-up here lends itself to the first mover choosing the 
best available quality level (e.g. Choi and Shin 1992; Wauthy 1996).20 
With the NB quality set at unity, the reservation price on the NB is 𝜃, which represents maximum 
willingness to pay for both consumer types. If the NB price exceeds this level, and the SB does not 
represent any better and acceptable value, then consumers will not buying anything and instead 
exercise their outside option (which could be thought of as them leaving the retailer to buy a 
completely different brand from a completely different distribution channel).   
Accordingly, a necessary and sufficient condition for Loyals to buy is that 𝑝1 ≤ 𝜃 , and if this 
condition is met then they will buy 𝜇 units regardless of how low is the price (i.e. their demand is 
fixed and being satiated they will pocket any consumer surplus, i.e. (𝑝1 − 𝜃)𝜇).  For Switchers, the 
necessary requirement to buy positive amounts is for 𝑝1 < 𝜃 or 𝑝2 < 𝜃𝑠2, but the actual amounts 
bought of each good will depend on whether only the NB is available (considered in section 3, 
where the requirement is 𝑝1 < 𝜃) or both the NB and SB are available (considered in section 4, 
where the requirement for positive quantities of both goods to be sold is  𝑠/𝑝2 > 1/𝑝1 > 1/𝜃).  
Unlike the binary nature of quantity bought by Loyals being either 0 or 𝜇 (i.e. rectangular demand 
with a flat demand curve at 𝑝1 = 𝜃 between 0 and 𝜇 units), quantity purchased by Switchers will 
increase the lower are the respective prices and the higher are the quality levels as more marginal 
consumers are brought into the market in a linear fashion, highlighting that total product demand 
from Switchers, denoted respectively for the NB and SB as 𝐷1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) and 𝐷2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠), is both 
price and quality sensitive.   
                                                          
20  We have in mind the situation where the NB is well-established, having built its reputation and image 
around a specific quality level and formulation that is now trusted and accepted by consumers to such an 
extent that it is locked into this position at least for the short-term regardless of whether the retailer 
introduces an SB and at what price and quality level it selects for the SB.  In line with Fousekis (2010), even 
with simultaneous setting of NB and SB quality then in our model the NB would position itself at the 
maximum possible level, leaving the SB to determine how close it would seek to position to the NB.  
However, for an alternative perspective that allows for NB producer to adapt its quality level and alter its 
market positioning in response to the position of an SB, see Heese (2010) and Nasser et al (2013). 
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The extent of overall product substitutability in the market is then captured both by how close is 
the SB quality relative to the NB quality and how small is the size of the segment of demand from 
Loyals relative to that of Switchers.  The latter aspect is not just down to number of Loyals, 
measured by 𝜇, but also relative to the maximum reservation price of 𝜃.  Accordingly, it will prove 
extremely useful to define the following term 𝛼 ≝ 𝜇/𝜃 as a parameter measuring the relative 
number of Loyals to Switchers for a given  𝜃, where a higher 𝛼 means that the relative number of 
Loyals in the population increases.  This term will feature extensively in our results. 
2.4 Firms’ revenues and costs 
The NB producer and retailer each have the objective of maximising its own profit.  Both parties 
have complete information in terms of understanding consumer demand, the decision structure 
for the timing and sequence of moves with product quality and availability determined before 
prices, and any costs in the industry.  We assume that only one retail price applies for each 
product for all consumers, so ruling out direct price discrimination either through individual 
prices targeted to individual consumers (i.e. first degree price discrimination) or to different 
segments (i.e. third-degree price discrimination), but not necessarily ruling out indirect price 
discrimination where consumers segment themselves through their purchase choices in 
response to the prices offered and for their given quality preferences (i.e. self-targeted second-
degree discrimination). Line revenue is then the price of the good, i.e. respectively 𝑝1and 𝑝2 , 
multiplied by the number of units sold, denoted respectively for the NB and SB as 𝑞1 and 𝑞2.  
Even though the products have potentially different quality we work with the assumption of 
symmetric and constant unit supply costs, c, which for simplicity we normalize to zero. This 
assumption follows Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2007) but warrants further explanation.21  We view 
product costs from the supplier as a combination of variable elements that make up the cost of 
production and distribution, e.g. ingredients, manufacturing, packaging, warehousing and 
physical distribution, as well as sunk investment costs that have gone into product design and 
marketing.  As our interest is with products that serve fundamentally the same purpose and are 
essentially the same in their physical composition and appearance, then we take it that their 
                                                          
21 This assumption of constant and common unit costs is quite commonly used in such models as it aids 
mathematical tractability and supports the focus on gross category profits.  For example, Sethuraman 
(2009) finds that 14 out of 22 papers reviewed use this assumption in their analytical models.  
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variable production and distribution costs will be broadly similar.22   For example, while the 
national brand might have superior ingredients or be manufactured to a higher specification, this 
potential cost disadvantage compared to lower-quality smaller-volume retailer-specific store 
brands might be offset by superior efficiency associated with economies of scale (size advantages) 
and economies of experience (learning-by-doing advantages).   
Apart from variable costs, quality differences in products can also relate to fixed costs which can 
come about through product invention, formulation and packaging design as well as initial 
marketing to support perceived quality differences, e.g. to build brand reputation and trust.  We 
might expect the investment support to be high for a pioneering national brand, but we take such 
costs as fixed and sunk and past decisions (noting that we are assuming the NB is already at the 
top feasible quality position in the market with 𝑠1 = 1).  However, fixed costs for quality design 
might be considerably less for a re-engineered “me too” store brand not supported by marketing, 
and we take such fixed costs to be at a sufficiently low level that they do not impinge on the store 
brand quality level determined by the retailer, and without further loss of generality we discount 
them and set these fixed costs to be zero.   
Nevertheless, even though the store brand might be able to replicate at minimal fixed cost the 
physical quality, performance and general appearance of the national brand by simple re-
engineering, it might not be able to match its perceived quality at any reasonable cost when this 
is down to brand image and reputation built up over many years and especially if this is protected 
in respect of the national brand’s trade mark, trade dress or other intellectual property rights.  In 
this case, there might be an upper limit to the store brand’s quality level in terms of how close it 
can go towards matching the national brand’s quality.  We allow for this possibility by contrasting 
the situation where the store brand is able to set any level it likes within the full quality spectrum, 
i.e. 𝑠 ∈ [0,1], against where it is constrained to a maximum level, ?̅? < 1, with a restricted choice 
𝑠 ∈ [0, ?̅?].   
Accordingly, in terms of product quality decisions the focus will be on the demand and revenue 
effects associated with competition rather than differences in costs.  Nonetheless, as will become 
evident, our results would hold even with asymmetric variable or fixed costs as long as the cost 
                                                          
22  Clearly, this might not hold for very low quality store brands, like “budget” and “economy” private label 
ranges which use very cheap and inferior ingredients and packaging, but our interest is in what are 
essentially “me too” standard store brands which have to perform inline if not quite as good as their 
national brand equivalents.  It is this type of store brands which still predominate in the market. 
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magnitudes and cost differences between the two goods were not too large.  In addition, we 
capture cost obstacles restricting store brand quality through our examination of the effect of the 
retailer facing an upper limit to the quality level it can set and by consideration of the 
restrictiveness of the available quality range for the store brand. 
For the retailer’s costs, we assume that these comprise two variable elements covering cost of 
purchasing goods from suppliers to be resold and the associated retailing costs.  We take the latter 
to be constant per unit and without loss of generality set this at zero.23  For the former, we assume 
that the NB producer supplies the retailer at constant per unit wholesale price, denoted by w.  As 
explained in the next sub-section we look at different scenarios as to how and when this 
wholesale price is set based on the extent to which one party has channel control.  If in addition 
the retailer sells a store brand then this is assumed to be supplied on a perfectly competitive basis 
and at marginal production cost, which we have already assumed is zero.24   
Summarising, there are two key demand parameters, 𝜃 and 𝜇 (with the interactive term 𝛼), plus 
four variables,  𝑝1, 𝑝2, w and s, which determine market outcomes.  The retailer’s profit function 
when it commits to selling only the NB is 𝜋𝑅(𝑝1, 𝑤) = (𝑝1 −𝑤)𝑞1 and the NB producer’s profit 
function is 𝜋𝑁(𝑝1, 𝑤) = 𝑤𝑞1, while if the retailer sells both the NB and the SB then the two profit 
functions are respectively 𝜋𝑅(𝑝1, 𝑝1, 𝑤, 𝑠) = (𝑝1 −𝑤)𝑞1 + 𝑝1𝑞1 and 𝜋𝑁(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑤, 𝑠) = 𝑤𝑞1. 
For convenience and future reference, Table 1 provides a list and definitions for the mathematical 
notation used in the paper. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 We ignore the retailer’s fixed costs associated with operating stores while we are focusing on individual 
category decisions, but clearly any category-level profit made could contribute to the retailer’s overall cost 
base. 
24  While it is commonly assumed that the wholesale price paid by a retailer on store brands are driven 
down to marginal cost levels by the retailer playing off desperately competitive suppliers against each other 
(e.g. by auctioning supply rights), in practice store brand suppliers can hold a degree of market power of 
their own when they are specialists in their field, provide unrivalled store brand product quality and build 
up a long-term relationship with the retailer.  For example, see ter Braak et al (2013).  
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Table 1 – Mathematical Notation 
Symbol Values Description 
𝜃 𝜃~𝑈[𝜃, 𝜃] 
Taste parameter indexing Switcher consumers of unit density uniformly 
distributed between 𝜃 and 𝜃 
𝜃 > 1 Maximum value of 𝜃 
𝜃 = 𝜃 − 1 > 0 Minimum value of 𝜃 
𝜇 ⋚ 1 
Mass of Loyal consumers (greater than, equal to, or less than unity, i.e. the 
density of Switcher consumers) 
𝛼 ≡ 𝜇/𝜃 
The relative number of Loyals to Switchers for a given  𝜃 (reflecting the 
relative number of Loyals in the total population)  
𝑠1 = 1 National brand quality level (set at unity as a benchmark level) 
𝑠 ≡ 𝑠2 ∈ [0,1] Store brand quality level (with feasible range from zero to unity) 
?̅? < 1 Maximum attainable level for constrained store brand quality 
𝑝1  National brand retail price 
𝑝2  Store brand retail price 
𝑉(𝜃, 𝑠𝑖) = 𝜃𝑠𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖  
Utility function for a Switcher consumer of type 𝜃 buying good i (= 1, 2) at 
quality level 𝑠𝑖  at retail price 𝑝𝑖  
𝑉(𝜃, 𝑠1) = 𝜃 − 𝑝1 
Utility function of a Loyal consumer prepared to pay up to 𝜃  for the 
national brand (of quality 𝑠1= 1) 
𝑞1  National brand quantity sold 
𝑞2  Store brand quantity sold 
𝑄 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 Total quantity of all goods sold 
𝑐 0 Unit production cost facing producers (set at zero) 
𝑤 ≡ 𝑤1 ≤ 𝑝1 National brand unit wholesale price 
𝑤2 0 Store brand unit wholesale price (set at zero) 
𝜋𝑅  
= (𝑝1 −𝑤)𝑞1
+ 𝑝2𝑞2 
Retailer’s profit as the product of the unit retail margin and the quantity 
sold for each available product 
𝜋𝑁 = 𝑤𝑞1 
National brand producer’s profit as the product of the unit price charged 
to the retailer and the quantity of the national brand sold 
Π 𝜋𝑅 + 𝜋𝑁  
Industry profit as the sum of the retailer’s profit and national brand 
producer’s profit 
𝐶𝑆  Consumer surplus as the sum total of all individual consumer utility levels  
𝑇𝑊 Π + 𝐶𝑆 Total economic welfare as the sum of industry profit and consumer surplus 
2.5 Decision structure and degree of channel control 
We take the view that each firm’s decision regarding product quality is a strategic variable 
involving longer-term commitment than prices, which are viewed as more flexible and more 
tactical in nature. This supports the use of a sequential decision structure where product quality 
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levels are determined first and then, in knowledge of which products are available and at which 
quality level, prices are determined. 25   With this sequential structure, we will be seeking to 
identify sub-game perfect equilibrium outcomes to characterise the set of equilibrium decisions 
and market outcomes.   
In regard to product quality, as mentioned in section 2.3, we will be assuming that the NB 
producer has moved first and fixed its NB product quality at the maximum feasible level for a 
defined product in a given product category. We have in mind a standard manufactured consumer 
packaged food or non-food good with an established brand which operates with a consistent and 
recognised formulation and appearance and where all economic agents – industry participants 
and consumers alike – fully recognise the NB’s top quality and image.  Given this fixed and 
observable NB quality, the retailer then has the option to introduce a “me too” SB to rival the NB 
and decide on the SB quality relative to that of the NB.  The SB quality choice is in respect of how 
consumers perceive the quality level when making purchase decisions, so it can extend beyond 
physical quality (which the SB might be more able to replicate) to less tangible aspects influenced 
by extrinsic cues such as the retailer’s image (which can make it harder for the SB to match the 
NB).26 
                                                          
25 In contrast, Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2007) and Groznik and Heese (2010a) examine the situation where 
the NB producer can make a long-term commitment to the NB wholesale price and make this conditional 
on whether or not the retailer decides to offer a store brand, thus allowing for consideration of how the 
two parties could agree to NB exclusivity (i.e. a non-compete contract) that excludes the SB.  This is an 
interesting line of enquiry and has potentially interesting applications but it does not match the setting we 
have in mind with longer-term product quality commitments and both wholesale and retail prices being 
somewhat more flexible, so they can be adjusted accordingly to realised demand conditions.  We also have 
doubts about whether such exclusivity agreements would be enforceable in practice.  First, the retailer will 
have an incentive to renege on such an agreement if it could promise exclusivity to obtain a lower NB 
wholesale price and then renege and introduce an SB and make more profit in the process (especially if 
there were a competitive threat from other retailers selling SBs).  Second, it is not clear that either of the 
parties would want to go to court and suffer from the negative publicity by publicly admitting they agreed 
to a conspiratorial deal that would deny consumers choice of a cheaper alternative product. Thirdly, such 
an agreement might be viewed as anti-competitive in denying other (SB) producers access to the market 
so be challenged by competition authorities.  Nevertheless, we accept that it is not impossible that such 
secret deals could exist and so, other than the cost of an SB being unusually high, they might explain why a 
retailer could be slow or reluctant to develop an SB in a product category. 
26  Accordingly here we are treating the NB’s market positioning as being locked in by its image and 
reputation, which could have been established over many years or indeed decades, utilising a fixed 
formulation and appearance, whereas the SB is a later development and response to the NB’s position.  An 
alternative approach would be to look at where the NB has the opportunity to respond and re-position its 
product position in response to a SB challenge, e.g. Heese (2010) and Nasser et al (2013). Furthermore, we 
are assuming complete information so that consumers are aware of the NB and SB product quality before 
buying the good (e.g. based on their own prior experience or learning from other sources like reviews).  An 
alternative approach is to consider SBs as experience goods, so that consumers need time to learn about 
SB product quality, e.g. Bergès-Sennou and Waterson (2005). 
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Following product qualities being set, there are three prices to be determined: the NB wholesale 
price (w), the NB retail price ( 𝑝1) and the SB retail price ( 𝑝2).  As this is a market structure with 
successive dominant firms in the supply chain, it is not immediately clear whether one or other 
party would be able to dominate the other.  In trying to keep the model straightforward and avoid 
a complicated bargaining analysis yet still allow for consideration of a wide set of possibilities, 
we consider three very different “Scenarios” regarding channel control.  In all cases, we assume 
the retailer has unilateral control over the SB product quality and SB retail pricing decisions, but 
in the three scenarios we allow for very different perspectives on who controls the NB wholesale 
price and the NB retail price.  The three Scenarios are as follows:  
A. The producer has direct control over the NB retail price by de facto dictating the retail 
price to be set, as could be achieved by a contractual obligation like RPM,27 as well as also 
dictating the NB wholesale price, i.e. a scenario with complete NB producer vertical 
control 
B. The NB producer has no influence over the NB retail price or wholesale price and the 
retailer has full control and is unconstrained in simultaneously setting the NB price and 
NB wholesale price, i.e. a scenario with complete retailer vertical control 
C. The producer has only indirect influence over the NB retail price by its ability to 
unilaterally dictate the NB wholesale price which the retailer takes as a cost and then in 
turn adds on its own margin in unilaterally determining the NB retail price, i.e. a scenario 
with separate and successive vertical control (where the producer can only indirectly 
influence the NB retail price by affecting the retailer’s cost through the wholesale price 
level it sets in anticipation of the mark-up the retailer will subsequently add on).  
To make these differences as explicit as possible, we assume unilateral decision making and 
contrast the extremes where under “Scenario A” the producer dictates both the retail and 
wholesale prices of the NB, which will entail setting them at the same level to extract all profits 
on the sales of the NB, while under “Scenario B” the retailer dictates both the retail and wholesale 
                                                          
27 To be precise, what is required is maximum RPM in the form of a produced-imposed price cap, e.g. 
contractually enforced as a condition of supply, but this might be achieved in other ways such as the NB 
products being supplied with printed price marks on the packaging or advertising the NB product price (so 
obliging the retailer to meet consumers’ expectations).  Analogously, but outside the scope of our model, it 
could be that the constraint on how high the NB price can be set is conditioned by retailer competition, e.g. 
where the retailer is constrained by wanting to match or beat the brand price that already exists in the 
market, i.e. already set by rival retailers, for example as part of a “price match” commitment or promise to 
its shoppers not to be beaten on brand prices, but necessary on store brands which are by their very nature 
not exact product matches. For instance, most of the leading UK supermarkets currently operate with such 
price promises on brand prices (King 2013). 
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prices of the NB, which will entail setting the wholesale price at the producer’s marginal cost, here 
set at 0, to extract all profits on the sales of the NB.  In practice, we might expect something less 
extreme, with bargaining over the wholesale price or over a lump sum fee in both scenarios as a 
means of dividing profits between the two parties.  However, the key aspect that these two 
scenarios share in common is that they involve efficient contracting, in the sense that the transfer 
price does not impact on the retail price so joint profits are maximised from the trade, even if the 
allocation of these joint profits goes to opposite extremes, with the producer gaining all profits 
under Scenario A and the retailer gaining all profits under Scenario B.  Nevertheless, it will 
become evident from our analysis that while there would be no difference between the NB 
producer or the retailer setting the NB retail price on the market outcomes for consumers when 
there is only the NB available, it could matter considerably when an SB is available to compete 
with the NB.  This aspect goes to the heart of the double agency issue that we will be examining, 
as it alters the nature of the relationship between the NB producer and retailer in respect of the 
retailer acting both as customer and competitor for the NB producer and how this impacts 
consumers.28 
Given these two scenarios are extreme alternatives, we also consider under “Scenario C” an 
intermediate case where both parties have a degree of market power, with the producer 
unilaterally setting the NB wholesale price and then the retailer unilaterally setting the NB retail 
price by marking up on the wholesale price.   Specifically, we consider the commonly employed 
Stackelberg-type sequence of price setting, where the NB producer first sets a constant per unit 
wholesale price (independent of actual sales levels achieved) to maximise its own profit by 
                                                          
28 The contrast between Scenarios A and B really puts into perspective two very different situations that 
are not completely implausible.  Scenario A focuses on the retailer’s incentive to position and price the SB 
in a way that allows it to generate profits from a starting position of zero if it just sells the NB.  Here, one 
could think of a situation where the retailer is obliged to retail the NB as it represents a “must-stock item”, 
such that if it did not stock the product it would lose a significant number of its customers to rival retailers 
and in the process lose profits that it would make on sales in other product categories.  In marked contrast, 
in Scenario B with the retailer calling all the shots, it is as if it owns or controls the NB with exclusive rights 
and so the product is really just an exclusive “premium” store brand but happens to carry a producer brand 
name rather than the store name, then leaving the retailer to contemplate whether to also offer a “standard” 
store brand as a cheaper alternative.  The retailer could then control their positioning in tandem, for 
example pricing the premium SB for its special appeal to brand-conscious consumers and the standard SB 
serving less discerning value-conscious consumers.   
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anticipating the retail price that the retailer subsequently determines when taking this wholesale 
price as a cost and adding a mark-up to that level to maximise its own profit.29   
This is a useful intermediate scenario to consider since it allows for the possibility of both parties 
making profits, which seems natural in such bilateral monopoly situations, without the need for 
formal bargaining analysis.  However, its use comes with two caveats to bear in mind.  First, it 
generally entails a first-mover advantage (because of strategic substitutability arising from the 
complementary demand relationship of the parties’ respective services and with price rather 
than quantity being the choice variable), which ceteris paribus benefits the producer over the 
retailer.  Second, it can result in inefficient contracting in the sense that joint profits might not be 
maximised when double marginalisation arises from the successive unilateral pricing decisions 
not internalising all externality effects, with the upshot that from a jointly optimising perspective 
the retail price can be set too high resulting in sub-optimal sales (and so in common parlance this 
leaves “money on the table” which more efficient contracting could extract).  This is not just bad 
for the parties in forgoing profits.  It is also bad for consumers when it entails them paying higher 
prices than they would otherwise do with more efficient contracting, so potentially a lose/lose 
situation; which can explain why competition authorities might be prepared to allow RPM under 
Scenario A, when it effectively acts as maximum RPM in imposing a ceiling on the retail price to 
avoid this kind of double marginalisation problem.30 
Taking these three scenarios together, we should expect contrasting outcomes for the individual 
parties in terms of the profits they each achieve but what will also be interesting to see is what 
effect these will have on market outcomes for consumers, and so the breadth of these scenarios 
allow us to address several pertinent questions to see how consistent are the findings.  For 
example, will the basis of how the NB retail price is determined make it more or less likely that 
an SB will be introduced?  Will it influence the decision the retailer makes about the choice of 
                                                          
29  For example, Sethuraman’s (2009) review of analytical models finds that 12 out of 22 papers used this 
Stackelberg wholesale-then-retail pricing set-up, and this trend has continued with a number of recent 
theoretical papers continuing to employ this form of price setting.  
30 To be clear, what the NB producer requires is maximum RPM to set a price cap so that the retailer can 
always set a lower price but cannot raise the NB price above the set threshold and thereby choke off NB 
demand, either to raise the retailer’s own profit margin or favour SB sales.  Competition authorities tend to 
take a more lenient view of maximum RPM of this nature, recognising its benefits in limiting prices while 
allowing retailers freedom to undercut each other if they so wish, rather than fixed or minimum RPM which 
prevents such intrabrand price competition.   
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quality of the SB relative to the quality of the NB?  How will consumer prices and overall consumer 
welfare be affected by the choices made?  
In proceeding with the analysis, we examine first (in Section 3), as a benchmark case, the situation 
where the NB is the only product available.  We then move on to consider (in Section 4) the 
outcomes and nature of competition when there is a SB available to compete with the NB.  We 
then compare the results (in Section 5) to determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcomes 
in respect of the product choices that are made available to consumers and their quality and the 
resulting market outcomes in terms of price and quantities and their net effect on profits for the 
different parties and consumer welfare (measured in terms of consumer surplus).  Afterwards, 
we discuss (in Section 6) the implications of these results for the industry participants, consumers 
and regulators. 
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3. National Brand Monopoly 
As a base case and reference point, consider the situation where the NB is the only product 
available.  For the party determining the NB retail price, the choice is to serve just Loyals or both 
consumer segments.  We consider these two choices in turn, comparing the outcomes under each 
of the three different scenarios for how the NB retail price is determined.  For convenience and 
ease of comparison, all the results discussed in this section are summarised in Table 2. 
3.1 Pricing the NB to sell only to Loyals 
By pricing in a manner which targets Loyals but seeks to exclude Switchers, then regardless of 
whether the NB price is set under Scenario A, B or C (as characterised in section 2.5 above), the 
relevant profit function will be maximised by setting the retail price at the reservation price of 
the Loyal consumers, i.e. 𝑝1 = 𝜃. This puts Loyals in a position where they find it just worthwhile 
to buy the product but leaves them with no consumer surplus while the price level is such that it 
cuts off all sales to Switchers.  Any higher level and all sales are lost.  Any lower level and surplus 
is given away with no benefit of extra sales from Loyals who will buy 𝜇  units regardless of 
whether the retail price is at or below their reservation price level.  So if the decision is to only 
target Loyals then price is set at 𝑝1 = 𝜃 and the resulting quantity sold is 𝑞1 = 𝜇 and total profit 
generated is Π = 𝑝1𝑞1 = 𝜇𝜃 = 𝛼?̅?
2.   
While in this case it makes no difference to consumers as to who sets the retail price, there will 
be clear differences in the division of total profit depending on who sets the NB retail price under 
Scenarios A, B and C.  For Scenario A, the NB producer captures all the profits by setting both the 
retail and wholesale price at the same level, i.e. 𝑝1 = 𝑤 = 𝜃 and so 𝜋𝑁 = 𝑤𝑞1 =  𝑝𝑞1 = 𝜇𝜃. For 
Scenario B, the retailer captures all the profits by setting the wholesale price at zero, i.e. 𝜋𝑅 =
(𝑝1 −𝑤)𝑞1 = (𝜃 − 0)𝜇 = 𝜇𝜃.  For Scenario C, and with just Loyals to be served, the NB producer, 
knowing that the retailer will be constrained in setting the retail price at the limit where Loyals 
will just be willing to buy, i.e.  𝑝1 = 𝜃 , will set its wholesale price to extract all the profits, so set 
𝑤 = 𝜃, thus earning 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑤𝑞1 = 𝜇𝜃, but leaving the retailer with 𝜋𝑅 = (𝑝1 −𝑤)𝑞1 = (𝜃 − 𝜃)𝜇 =
0. 
 
3.2 Pricing the NB to sell to both Loyals and Switchers 
29 
 
When it comes to pricing at an affordable level to appeal to both segments, there is a balance to 
be struck in pitching the price at a level sufficiently low to attract a good number of Switcher 
consumers, who in addition to Loyal consumers result in increased sales, but not so low as to give 
away too much consumer surplus to the high-reservation-price inframarginal consumers, notably 
Loyal consumers, and in the process make less profits on sales to these consumers.   With quantity 
demanded expressed as 𝑞1(𝑝1) = 𝜇 + 𝜃 − 𝑝1, the available total profit is Π = 𝑝1𝑞1(𝑝1) = 𝑝1(𝜇 +
𝜃 − 𝑝1).  Under Scenario A, the NB producer would set the retail price to maximise this total profit.  
Likewise, the retailer would do the same under Scenario B.  So in both scenarios the optimal price 
is 𝑝1 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) , resulting in sales of 𝑞1 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃)  and total profit of  Π = 1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 =
1
4
(1 + 𝛼)2?̅?2.  The difference is that all this profit would be captured by the NB producer under 
Scenario A and by the retailer under Scenario B. 
While we can observe that the retail price, quantity and total profit are all increasing in both 𝜇 and 
𝜃, these levels are constrained by the retail price satisfying the requirement that it must be less 
than the upper threshold which chokes off all demand from Switchers.  This is determined by the 
proportion of Loyals to Switchers for a given level of 𝜃 , represented by 𝛼 ≡  𝜇𝜃 , which if it 
exceeds a critical level then the retail price will be driven up so high as to cut off all demand by 
the Switchers.  Specifically, in order for both segments to be served then 𝑝1 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) = 1
2
(1 +
𝛼)𝜃 < 𝜃, which can only hold if 𝛼 < 1. Comparing the two profits levels, we observe that the total 
profit is higher from serving just Loyals when 𝛼 > 1, and higher serving both segments when 𝛼 <
1.  
Under Scenarios A and B, the efficient contracting between the retailer and NB producer ensures 
that the retail price is not influenced by any transfer price or wholesale price, so it does not matter 
if it is the NB producer or the retailer setting the NB retail price, as they would both choose the 
same level to maximise the available joint profits.   
In contrast, under Scenario C, the combination of successive wholesale-then-retail price setting 
will result in double marginalisation when demand is variable.  Here, the NB producer leads by 
first setting a constant per unit wholesale price, 𝑤, to maximise its own profit, and the retailer 
follows by taking this wholesale price as a cost and then seeking to add a mark-up to that level 
when unilaterally setting the retail price to maximise its own profit.  Yet, serving both segments 
is only possible if 𝑝1 < 𝜃, which will mean in this Stackelberg-type leader-follower set-up that the 
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NB producer, in reasoning ahead as to the retail price that the retailer will subsequently set, will 
have to set the wholesale price with the restriction that 𝑤 < 𝑝1(𝑤) < 𝜃.   
To see how much less the NB producer’s wholesale price will need to be compared to the retail 
price set by the retailer, observe that the retailer’s profit function is 𝜋𝑅(𝑝1(𝑤)) = (𝑝1(𝑤) −
𝑤)𝑞1(𝑝1(𝑤)) = (𝑝1 −𝑤)(𝜇 + 𝜃 − 𝑝1).  Maximizing with respect to 𝑝1  yields the retail price 
conditioned on the wholesale price as 𝑝1(𝑤) =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃 + 𝑤) and resulting quantity as 𝑞1(𝑤) =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃 − 𝑤). Anticipating this, the NB producer will set it wholesale price to maximise its own 
profit, taken as 𝜋𝑁 = 𝑤𝑞1(𝑤) =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃 − 𝑤)𝑤, and thus set 𝑤 = 1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃), which in turn means 
once the retailer has added its mark-up the retail price will be set at 𝑝1 =
3
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)  and so 
generating sales of 𝑞1 =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃) , with the resulting profit for the NB producer at 𝜋𝑁 =
1
8
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 = 1
8
(1 + 𝛼)2?̅?2 and for the retailer at  𝜋𝑅 =
1
16
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 = 1
16
(1 + 𝛼)2?̅?2 , with combined 
profits of Π = 3
16
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 = 3
16
(1 + 𝛼)2?̅?2 , which is less than would be earned under efficient 
contracting because of double marginalisation.   
However, with the constraint on the retail price that 𝑝1 < 𝜃 then achieving these outcomes is only 
possible if 𝑝1 =
3
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃) < 𝜃 , which is satisfied only if 𝛼 < 1
3
 and this acts as a constraint on the 
circumstances under which both segments will be served.  So, in contrast to outcomes under 
efficient contracting, inefficient contracting with double marginalisation provides less scope for 
serving both segments arising as an equilibrium outcome, requiring 𝛼 < 1
3
, as opposed to 𝛼 < 1 
under efficient contracting. 
 
In summary, when the proportion of Loyals to Switchers for a given level of  𝜃, represented by 
𝛼 ≡  𝜇𝜃, exceeds a certain level then it is not in the firms’ respective profit interests to serve both 
consumer segments but instead just target the NB at Loyals.  The critical value of 𝛼 depends on 
whether producer-retailer trading is characterised by efficient or inefficient contracting, in the 
sense of whether combined profits from the sale of the NB are optimised or not.  With efficient 
contracting, under Scenarios A and B, and despite them being complete opposite extremes in 
terms of who controls the setting of the NB retail price and extracts all the generated profits, 
serving both consumer segments is profitable for a wider range of values of 𝛼 , with the 
requirement that 𝛼 < 1, because efficient contracting allows for the retail price more effectively 
to be kept in check and not choke off demand to the Switchers.  In contrast, the double 
marginalisation effect under Scenario C means that only low levels of 𝛼, precisely 𝛼 < 1
3
, will be 
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sufficient to ensure that the retail price is kept below the level that chokes off demand to the 
Switchers and for any higher levels of 𝛼 then only Loyals will be served by the price being set 
exactly at their reservation price level. 
Table 2 collects together all these results and shows the NB monopoly outcomes under each 
Scenario, with the first superscript denoting the Scenario (A, B and C) and the second superscript 
denoting the NB monopoly (“M”) case, i.e. respectively superscripts AM, BM and CM.  The 
conditions are shown for the values of 𝛼 where only Loyals are served (i.e. with Switchers being 
effectively excluded from the market) and where both Loyals and Switchers are served (i.e. non-
exclusion). 
 
Table 2 – Outcomes with National Brand Monopoly 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
NB wholesale price 𝑤𝐴𝑀 = { 
𝜃                 if α ≥ 1 
1
2
(𝜇+𝜃)   if α<1 
 𝑤𝐵𝑀 = 0 𝑤𝐶𝑀 = { 
𝜃                if α ≥
1
3
1
2
(𝜇+𝜃)  if α<
1
3
 
NB retail price 𝑝1
𝐴𝑀 =  { 
𝜃                 if α ≥ 1 
1
2
(𝜇+𝜃)   if α<1 
 𝑝1
𝐵𝑀 =  { 
𝜃                 if α ≥ 1 
1
2
(𝜇+𝜃)   if α<1 
 𝑝1𝐶𝑀 =  { 
𝜃                 if α ≥
1
3
3
4
(𝜇+𝜃)   if α<
1
3
 
NB sales 𝑞1
𝐴𝑀 = { 
𝜇                 if α ≥ 1 
1
2
(𝜇+𝜃)   if α<1 
 𝑞1𝐵𝑀 =  { 
𝜇                 if α ≥ 1 
1
2
(𝜇+𝜃)   if α<1 
 𝑞1
𝐶𝑀 =  { 
𝜇                 if α ≥
1
3
3
4
(𝜇+𝜃)   if α<
1
3
 
NB producer profit 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝑀 = {
𝜇𝜃                 if α ≥ 1 
1
4
 (𝜇+𝜃)2  if α<1
 𝜋𝑁𝐵𝑀 = 0 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝑀 = { 
𝜇𝜃                if α ≥
1
3
1
8
(𝜇+𝜃)2  if α<
1
3
 
Retailer profit 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝑀 = 0 𝜋𝑅𝐵𝑀 = {
𝜇𝜃                 if α ≥ 1 
1
4
(𝜇+𝜃)2  if α<1
 𝜋𝑅𝐶𝑀 = {
 0                    if α ≥
1
3
1
16
(𝜇+𝜃)2  if α<
1
3
 
Total profits Π𝐴𝑀 = {
𝜇𝜃                 if α ≥ 1 
1
4
 (𝜇+𝜃)2  if α<1
 Π𝐵𝑀 = {
𝜇𝜃                 if α ≥ 1 
1
4
(𝜇+𝜃)2  if α<1
 Π𝐶𝑀 = {
 0                   if α ≥
1
3
3
16
(𝜇+𝜃)2  if α<
1
3
 
Consumer Surplus (CS) 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑀 = {
0                    if α ≥ 1
(𝜃−𝜇)(𝜃+3𝜇)
8
  if α<1
 𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑀 = {
0                     if α ≥ 1
(𝜃−𝜇)(𝜃+3𝜇)
8
   if α<1
 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑀 = {
0                      if α ≥
1
3
(𝜃−3𝜇)(𝜃+5𝜇)
32
  if α<
1
3
 
Total Welfare (TW) 𝑇𝑊𝐴𝑀 = {
𝜇𝜃                 if α ≥ 1
3?̅?2−𝜇2+6𝜃𝜇
8
  if α<1
 𝑇𝑊𝐵𝑀 = {
𝜇𝜃                if α ≥ 1
3?̅?2−𝜇2+6𝜃𝜇
8
  if α<1
 𝑇𝑊𝐶𝑀 = {
𝜇𝜃                    if α ≥
1
3
7?̅?2−9𝜇2+14𝜃𝜇
32
 if α<
1
3
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4. National Brand and Store Brand Duopoly 
Having considered the situation where the NB was the only choice available for consumers, we 
now move on to consider the outcomes when the retailer develops a store brand (SB) and offers 
this alongside the national brand (NB).  In principle, both products are available to all consumers 
when the retailer decides to offer both products.  However, by assumption, the Loyals will ignore 
the SB and not buy it regardless of its price, but instead only consider buying the NB and indeed 
do so as long as the NB price does not exceed their reservation price, i.e. so long as 𝑝1 ≤ 𝜃.  So in 
this set-up, the SB can only appeal to Switchers and how many units they choose to buy will 
depend on the SB’s absolute price but also its price relative to the NB price and the SB quality 
relative to the NB quality.  In respect of the NB, this can also appeal to the Switchers as well, but 
likewise how many units Switchers will buy will depend on its absolute price and the relative 
prices and relative qualities between the NB and SB.   
While it might be quite natural to consider the NB and SB competing head to head, fighting over 
the same set of customers, this is not only the possibility.  In the present set-up, where Loyals are 
the natural focus of attention for the NB, it is not immediately obvious that it would be either in 
the NB producer’s interest or the retailer’s interest for both the NB and the SB to compete for 
Switchers.  Specifically, if the NB were to compete for Switchers then the NB would have to be 
offered at a lower price than the Loyals’ reservation price, so allowing Loyals to gain consumer 
surplus but at the cost to the firms of reduced profits made on these consumers.   The lower the 
NB price to attract more Switchers, then the greater the foregone profits on Loyals but also the 
lower will have to be the price of the SB, and so the less profit that this product can make.  Instead, 
profits might be higher if there were segmentation through self-selection by the respective 
consumer segments, with the NB priced in a manner to appeal just to Loyals and the SB offered 
at a lower price to attract Switchers.   
However, whether targeted segmentation or direct head-to-head competition arises as an 
equilibrium outcome is likely to depend on who sets the NB price. Clearly the retailer will be 
inclined to give greater support to the SB over the NB if it helps to boost its own profits and 
undermines the NB producer’s power, and segmentation might help to achieve this when the 
retailer can suitably manage both the NB and SB retail prices.  In contrast, the NB producer might 
not wish to be limited to serving only Loyals but instead see benefits from obtaining higher sales 
volumes by attracting Switcher consumers, even if this means giving away some consumer 
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surplus to consumers with high reservation prices; though the ability of the NB producer to do 
this is likely to rest on how much it can control the NB price and prevent the retailer from choking 
off Switcher’s NB demand by how it positions the SB.  As we will see, it is not just NB and SB retail 
prices that matter but also the SB’s quality relative to that of the NB, and the extent to which the 
retailer can affect the SB’s perceived quality then the greater influence it will have to achieve the 
equilibrium outcome it desires. 
We start by examining the more straightforward case where there is targeted segmentation with 
only Loyals buying the NB and the SB left to serve the Switchers.  After considering this situation, 
we move on to consider the outcomes when there is competition over Switchers.  We then 
compare the two situations to show the equilibrium choices and the market conditions that apply 
for each of them to hold.   As in the previous section, all the results discussed in this section are 
tabled for convenience and ease of comparison and shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
4.1 NB and SB indirect competition: Targeted segmentation with the NB aimed at 
Loyals and the SB aimed at Switchers 
Given the nature of respective demand and differences in the willingness to pay between Loyals 
and Switchers, segmentation can arise in this set-up through how the two products are priced, 
with Loyals and Switchers self-selecting in respect of their product choice based on the NB and 
SB prices offered.  In this situation, the two products are not directly competing against each other 
in the sense of chasing precisely the same set of customers, but are doing so indirectly because of 
the price thresholds on the demand for each product by the different consumer types.  So, while 
Loyals are only interested in buying the NB, Switchers are open to considering buying either the 
NB or the SB, which means that their absolute and relative prices as well as relative qualities take 
on importance.  However, the critical aspect here is the absolute price of the NB since if this is set 
at a level that exceeds the willingness to pay for Switchers while still appealing to Loyals, then 
this will leave the SB completely free to target Switchers as effectively the only product option.  
Thus, implicitly there is a sequence to the pricing decisions – even if only by reasoning rather than 
by action – with the NB price set first to exclude Switchers and then the SB price set to extract as 
much profit as possible from selling to Switchers.   
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With this in mind then we can see that regardless of the pricing Scenario, i.e. A, B or C, for setting 
the NB retail price, the optimal price is for the NB to be priced at 𝑝1 = 𝜃, which is the maximum 
price at which the Loyals will buy but at a level which is sufficiently high to prevent Switchers 
buying the NB.  The difference in the price-setting scenarios is that all the profits on the sales of 
the NB (i.e. product “1”) to the Loyals will be extracted by the producer under Scenarios A and C, 
which we denote as 𝜋𝑁1 = 𝜇𝜃, and by the retailer under Scenario B, which we denote as 𝜋𝑅1 =
𝜇𝜃, for the reasons discussed above in sub-section 3.1. 
Then, with the NB priced in such a manner that it only appeals to Loyals and extracts all the 
consumer surplus from them, this leaves the retailer to target the SB at Switchers and seek to 
extract as much profit as possible from them while secure in the monopoly position that the SB 
holds over these particular consumers.  Given that the utility of a switching consumer of type 𝜃 
buying quality 𝑠 at price 𝑝2 is 𝑈(𝜃, 𝑠) = 𝜃𝑠 − 𝑝2 then the indifferent consumer is 𝜃0 = 𝑝2/𝑠, so 
that the demand from Switchers for the SB for a given price and quality is 𝑞2(𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝜃 − 𝑝2/𝑠.  
The retailer’s profit function for sales made on the SB (i.e. product “2”) to the Switchers is then 
𝜋𝑅2(𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝2(𝑠)𝑞2(𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝2(𝜃 − 
𝑝2
𝑠
). Maximising with respect to 𝑝2 and solving shows the 
SB price set by the retailer as a function of the SB’s quality is 𝑝2(𝑠) =
1
2
𝜃𝑠, so the price chosen by 
the retailer is increasing in both the upper willingness to pay parameter, 𝜃, and the SB’s quality, 
𝑠. In respect of the resulting level of SB sales achieved, this is 𝑞2 =
1
2
𝜃, so always equal to half the 
upper taste parameter and independent of 𝑠, and the resulting retailer’s profit on these sales to 
Switchers is 𝜋𝑅2(𝑠) =
1
4
?̅?2𝑠.  
In comparing the prices set respectively to the Loyals and the Switchers, for a given 𝑠 ≤ 1, we can 
observe that the NB price set for the Loyals, 𝑝1 = 𝜃, is at least double that of the SB price set for 
the Switchers, 𝑝2(𝑠) =
1
2
𝜃𝑠.  Indeed, even if the SB quality were to exactly match that of the NB 
quality in the eyes of the Switchers, with 𝑠 = 1, then the SB price would be half the NB price 
(which arises because even when the SB matches the product quality of the NB, the Switchers 
have lower reservation prices than the Loyals). Accordingly, in this segmented market 
arrangement, the Loyals really pay a high price for their blind loyalty to the NB, and the presence 
of the SB serves as no competitive restraint whatsoever on the NB price that the Loyals pay.  Yet, 
the presence of the SB may be even worse for Loyals, since when NB was the only available 
product then it could also be priced low enough to appeal to Switchers, which would occur under 
NB pricing Scenarios A and B if 𝛼 < 1 and under Scenario C if 𝛼 < 1
3
, and in those circumstances 
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the Loyals would pay a higher price following the SB being introduced and then consumers being 
segmented by prices being targeted to appeal only to their specific consumer type.   
However, for Switchers, they can gain by the presence of the SB.  When only the NB is available, 
they are either excluded from purchasing the product, when the NB price is set at 𝑝1 = 𝜃 (which 
occurs under NB pricing Scenarios A and B if 𝛼 ≥ 1, and under Scenario C if 𝛼 ≥ 1
3
), or they face a 
high price based on the weighted average sum of their and the Loyals’ willingness to pay, which 
is increasing in the proportion of Loyals to Switchers for a given maximum taste parameter 𝜃, as 
represented by 𝛼.  While segmentation prevents them affording the NB, the SB price they are 
offered represents better value for money, even accounting for product quality differences, than 
the NB monopoly price, and leads to higher sales levels from Switchers.   
The overall effect on consumer welfare arising from the introduction of the SB in this segmented 
market arrangement depends on the trade-off between any loss of consumer surplus for Loyals 
against the gain in consumer surplus for the Switchers.  Table 3 provides a summary of all the 
market outcomes with targeted segmentation, including showing the amount of consumer 
surplus generated at 𝐶𝑆 = 1
8
?̅?2𝑠 which is more than under the NB monopoly for Scenarios A and 
B only when 𝑠 > 1 + 2𝛼 − 3𝛼2, which even in the limit as 𝑠 → 1 will hold only if 𝛼 < 2
3
, while more 
than under the NB monopoly for Scenario C if 𝑠 > 1
4
(1 + 2𝛼 − 15𝛼2), which will necessarily hold 
if 𝑠 > 4
15
≈ 0.26̇6̇.  Accordingly, consumers only gain in aggregate if the SB quality is high and/or 
the proportion of Loyals is small relative to Switchers. 
So far, we have treated the SB quality as exogenous.  However, we can observe that the profit 
which the SB generates for the retailer is directly increasing in 𝑠.  If the retailer were freely and 
costlessly able to choose the SB’s product quality then it would choose to set SB quality at its 
absolute conceivable maximum, i.e. 𝑠 = 1.  In other words, it would seek to exactly match the 
quality of the NB, at least as perceived by Switchers even if ignored by Loyals.  Accordingly, rather 
than seek to stake out a differentiated position for the SB, the retailer would have exactly the 
opposite preference in facing a very strong profit motive to position the SB to exactly mimic the 
NB brand as a perfect substitute and clone.   
This incentive to set the SB quality level exactly the same as the NB quality is a striking result 
since it goes against the usual notion in vertical differentiation models that it is better for rival 
firms to differentiate their products to avoid intense head-to-head price competition.  However, 
we can note that in the market arrangement under consideration here involving complete 
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segmentation, the different product suppliers (i.e. the producer supplying the NB and the retailer 
supplying the SB) by definition avoid direct head-to-head competition over the same consumers, 
so it might not come as such a surprise.  Whether this same striking result carries over to 
situations where the two products in principle compete for the same consumers is an aspect that 
we address next when we examine direct NB and SB competition.  
Table 3 summarises this sub-section’s results, showing the outcomes which are conditioned on 
the SB quality (which arise for exogenous values of  𝑠) and also showing the outcomes if the 
retailer were able to set SB quality at its preferred level to maximise its own profits, which in all 
three Scenarios is 𝑠 = 1.  Superscripts AI, BI and CI respectively denote the equilibrium outcomes 
under each for Scenario (A, B or C) for this situation of indirect competition (“I”) with targeted 
segmentation of the NB for the Loyals and the SB for the Switchers. 
 
Table 3 – Outcomes with Indirect Competition between NB and SB for Segmentation 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
NB wholesale price 𝑤𝐴𝐼 = 𝜃 𝑤𝐵𝐼 = 0 𝑤𝐶𝐼 = 𝜃 
NB retail price 𝑝1
𝐴𝐼 = 𝜃 𝑝1
𝐵𝐼 = 𝜃 𝑝1
𝐶𝐼 = 𝜃 
SB retail price 𝑝2
𝐴𝐼 = { 
1
2
𝜃𝑠                
1
2
𝜃 for 𝑠=1
 𝑝2
𝐵𝐼 = { 
1
2
𝜃𝑠                
1
2
𝜃 for 𝑠→1
 𝑝2𝐶𝐼 = { 
1
2
𝜃𝑠                
1
2
𝜃 for 𝑠→1
 
NB sales 𝑞1
𝐴𝐼 = 𝜇 𝑞1𝐵𝐼 = 𝜇 𝑞1𝐶𝐼 = 𝜇 
SB sales 𝑞2
𝐴𝐼 =
1
2
𝜃 𝑞2𝐵𝐼 =
1
2
𝜃 𝑞2𝐶𝐼 =
1
2
𝜃 
NB producer profit 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐼 = 𝜇𝜃 𝜋𝑁𝐵𝐼 = 0 𝜋𝑁𝐶𝐼 = 𝜇𝜃 
Retailer profit 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐼 = { 
1
4
?̅?2𝑠               
1
4
?̅?2 for 𝑠=1
 𝜋𝑅𝐵𝐼 = { 
1
4
(4𝜇?̅? + 𝑠?̅?2)                
1
4
(4𝜇?̅?+?̅?2) for 𝑠=1
 𝜋𝑅𝐶𝐼 = { 
1
4
?̅?2𝑠                
1
4
?̅?2 for 𝑠→1
 
Total profit Π𝐴𝐼 = { 
1
4
(4𝜇?̅? + 𝑠?̅?2)                
1
4
(4𝜇?̅?+?̅?2)for 𝑠=1
 Π𝐵𝐼 = { 
1
4
(4𝜇?̅? + 𝑠?̅?2)                
1
4
(4𝜇?̅?+?̅?2) for 𝑠=1
 Π𝐶𝐼 = { 
1
4
(4𝜇?̅? + 𝑠?̅?2)                
1
4
(4𝜇?̅?+?̅?2) for 𝑠=1
 
Consumer Surplus 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐼 = {
 
1
8
?̅?2𝑠                
1
8
?̅?2 for 𝑠=1
 𝐶𝑆𝐵𝐼 = {
 
1
8
?̅?2𝑠                
1
8
?̅?2 for 𝑠=1
 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝐼 = {
 
1
8
?̅?2𝑠                
1
8
?̅?2 for 𝑠=1
 
Total Welfare 
𝑇𝑊𝐴𝐼
= {
1
8
(8𝜇?̅? + 3𝑠?̅?2)                
1
8
(8𝜇?̅?+3?̅?2) for 𝑠=1
 
𝑇𝑊𝐵𝐼
= {
1
8
(8𝜇?̅? + 3𝑠?̅?2)                
1
8
(8𝜇?̅?+3?̅?2) for 𝑠=1
 𝑇𝑊
𝐶𝐼 = {
1
8
(8𝜇?̅? + 3𝑠?̅?2)                
1
8
(8𝜇?̅?+3?̅?2) for 𝑠=1
 
 
37 
 
4.2 NB and SB direct competition: NB and SB both aimed at Switchers 
In contrast to the situation where the two goods are deliberately priced in a manner to serve 
different consumer segments, in this sub-section we consider the case where the NB and SB are 
in direct competition for the same customers.  While the SB by definition cannot compete with 
the NB for the custom of Loyals, we consider here the situation where for appropriate price levels 
they could compete directly for the custom of Switchers.    
We start by considering the situation where SB quality is given as 𝑠 < 1, i.e. quality below that of 
the NB, but we will be examining what happens in approaching the quality limit, as 𝑠 → 1.  We 
will also consider what happens at the point where the quality of the SB is viewed as being exactly 
the same as that of NB, i.e. 𝑠 = 1.  Covering all these cases will allows us to consider the retailer’s 
choice of 𝑠 once we have determined all the outcomes from pricing under the different scenarios 
and made comparisons with the results in the previous sub-section where consumers were 
purposefully segmented to see what market configuration is likely to emerge as an equilibrium 
outcome. 
With SB quality at 𝑠 < 1, the Switchers may be divided into three groups: those who buy the NB 
(product “1”), those who buy the (inferior) SB (product “2”), and those who do not buy at all.  The 
switching consumer who is indifferent between the NB and SB is characterized by ?̃? where 
?̃?𝑠 − 𝑝2 = ?̃? − 𝑝1 ⇔ ?̃? =
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
 
The switching consumer who is indifferent between the SB and not buying at all is characterised 
by 𝜃 such that  
𝜃𝑠 − 𝑝2 = 0 ⇔ 𝜃 =
𝑝2
𝑠
 
With a uniform distribution and unit mass of Switchers, their demand for the NB is then 
𝐷1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝜃 − ?̃? = 𝜃 −
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
 
and Switchers’ corresponding demand for the SB is 
𝐷2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = ?̃? − 𝜃 =
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
−
𝑝2
𝑠
 
We can observe that both goods will be sold to switchers if the following two constraints hold: 
𝜃 −
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
> 0⇔ (1 − 𝑠)𝜃 > 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 ;  for 𝑝1 < 𝜃  
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and 
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
−
𝑝2
𝑠
> 0 ⇔  
𝑠
𝑝2
>
1
𝑝1
 
The latter condition implies the quality per dollar (or euro) must be greater for the low-quality 
product otherwise no consumer would buy this product. 
With these conditions, the respective total quantities demanded for the NB and SB across both 
consumers segments are 
𝑞1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝜇 + 𝜃 −
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
 
𝑞2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) =
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
−
𝑝2
𝑠
 
Our next step is to determine the market outcomes under each of the three different scenarios for 
how the NB is priced while the retailer prices the SB.   We consider each pricing scenario in turn. 
 
4.2.1 Outcomes with NB pricing under Scenario A with Direct Competition (“AD”) 
We take the case where the retail prices of the NB and SB are set simultaneously and determined 
as a Nash equilibrium.31 With the NB producer setting the NB retail price and taking all the profit 
on sales (implicitly by setting its wholesale price equal to the retail price, i.e. 𝑤 = 𝑝1), then its 
profit function on sales to both Loyals and Switcher is: 
𝜋𝑁1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝1𝑞1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝1 (𝜇 + 𝜃 −
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
) 
Optimising with respect to 𝑝1, the NB producer’s best-response function is 
𝑝1(𝑝2, 𝑠) =
1
2
[(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃) + 𝑝2] 
                                                          
31 The alternative would be to consider sequential retail price setting and a Stackelberg leader-follower 
equilibrium, say with the NB producer first setting the NB retail price with a commitment to the price 
through its RPM contract and which the retailer could then subsequently respond in setting the SB retail 
price.  However, we instead assume that retail price commitments are not so steadfast and that adjustment 
can be made, and in the absence of any other a priori reason for price setting being sequenced we assume 
simultaneous retail price setting and, with complete information on each other’s situation and preferences, 
each competing party correctly anticipating each other’s optimal conditioned decision to arrive at a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium. 
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For the retailer setting the SB price, the SB’s only sales can be achieved through selling to 
Switchers and the retailer’s profit function is simply 
𝜋𝑅2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝2𝑞2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝2 (
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
−
𝑝2
𝑠
) 
Optimising with respect to 𝑝2, the retailer’s best-response function is 
𝑝2(𝑝1, 𝑠) =
1
2
𝑠𝑝2 
Solving for equilibrium prices: 
𝑝1(𝑠) =    
2(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
4 − 𝑠
  =  
2(1 − 𝑠)(1 + 𝛼)𝜃
4 − 𝑠
<   𝜃 if  𝛼 <
2 + 𝑠
2(1 − 𝑠)
∈ [1,∞) for 𝑠 ∈ [0,1) 
𝑝2(𝑠) =    
𝑠(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
4 − 𝑠
  =  
𝑠(1 − 𝑠)(1 + 𝛼)𝜃
4 − 𝑠
 
The conditions on the requirement for 𝑝1(𝑠) <  𝜃 ensure that the NB generates some sales with 
Switchers and so is directly competing against the SB for their custom.   In these circumstances, 
the NB price will be at least double the SB price, as shown by their ratio: 
𝑝2(𝑠)
𝑝1(𝑠)
=
𝑠
2
 ∈ [0,
1
2
)  for 𝑠 ∈ [0,1) 
The resulting equilibrium sales for the NB and SB are then: 
𝑞1(𝑠) =
2(𝜇 + 𝜃)
4 − 𝑠
> 𝜇 if  𝛼 <
2
2 − 𝑠
∈ [1,2) for 𝑠 ∈ [0,1)   ;   𝑞2(𝑠) =
𝜇 + 𝜃
4 − 𝑠
      
Assuming this condition on 𝛼 is met, and so the NB makes positive sales to Switchers, then sales 
of the NB are double those of the SB regardless of the SB’s quality, so that even if there were just 
a fractional difference in the quality of the two products then the NB, by still fractionally being 
the superior product of the two, gains considerably over the fractionally inferior SB.  
The combination of the NB being pitched at a higher price and yet selling more units means that 
the profit for the NB producer exceeds that of the retailer by more than four-fold: 
𝜋𝑁1(𝑠) =
4(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)2
(4 − 𝑠)2
    ;   𝜋𝑅2(𝑠) =
𝑠(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)2
(4 − 𝑠)2
   ;       
𝜋𝑁1(𝑠)
𝜋𝑅2(𝑠)
=  
4
𝑠
 
Given this outcome from pricing competition, we can consider next the retailer’s preference for 
where it would like to position the SB in terms of its quality.   Maximising 𝜋𝑅2(𝑠) with respect to 
𝑠 and solving reveals that the optimal level of SB quality for the retailer is 𝑠 = 4
7
≈ 0.57.   This is 
the same quality level as derived by Choi and Shin (1992) in a standard two-firm vertical 
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differentiation model where the market is not fully covered and the firm operating with the 
inferior product has to determine the quality level in balancing the desire to raise product quality 
to drive more sales against the impact of this intensifying price competition, so driving prices 
down, as the two products become less differentiated.   In this situation, the firm with the inferior 
product prefers a quality position at slightly over the mid-way point.  The same balancing 
calculation is going on in the present set-up with the same outcome in terms of the preferred 
quality position.  However, the difference here is that the sales levels achieved for both firms are 
affected by the proportion of Loyals relative to Switchers, as they are increasing in total as this 
proportion increases (represented by 𝛼 increasing) but declining for the NB in its Switcher sales 
as it focuses more on extracting surplus from Loyals which allows the SB to increase sales to 
Switchers but still means that fewer Switchers are served overall, i.e. less of the market is covered.   
If the retailer were able to set  𝑠 = 4
7
   then this would allow the retailer to sell 𝑞2 =
7
24
(𝜇 + 𝜃) and 
make a profit of 𝜋𝑅2 =
1
48
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2, while sales of the NB would be 𝑞1 =
7
12
(𝜇 + 𝜃) and the producer 
would earn 𝜋𝑁1 =
7
48
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2, i.e. seven times more than the retailer.  Nevertheless, this would 
still leave the producer worse off than if it held a monopoly position and sold to both segments, 
where (from sub-section 3.2) its profit would be 𝜋𝑁1 =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2. It would also leave the industry 
as a whole worse off with joint profits at  Π =  𝜋𝑁1 + 𝜋𝑅2 =
1
6
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2.  
However, from the consumers’ perspective this is a more attractive situation than when only the 
NB was available and being sold to both segments.  In the present case with 𝑠 = 4
7
, the combined 
quantity of the NB and SB sales is 𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 = 
7
8
(𝜇 + 𝜃), so that considerably more of the 
potential market is covered, compared to when the NB was holding a monopoly position targeting 
both segments with 𝑄 = 𝑞1 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) (as shown above in sub-section 3.2).  Also, the price paid 
for the NB is lower at 𝑝1 =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃) , which is exactly half the level compared to when the NB is 
in a monopoly position with 𝑝1 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃).  Accordingly, it is not just Switchers that gain by the 
introduction of the SB but Loyals as well with the producer and retailer competing head-to-head 
for the custom of Switchers.   Indeed, the difference in consumer surplus in this situation from the 
level attained under NB monopoly is equal to  1
6
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2, i.e. a gain in surplus for consumers equal 
the amount of joint industry profit under this direct competition.32 
                                                          
32 Consumer surplus consists of the surplus attained by three groups: Loyals purchasing the NB; quality-
oriented Switchers purchasing the NB; and value-oriented Switchers purchasing the SB. Formally stated:   
𝐶𝑆 = (𝜃 − 𝑝1)𝜇 + ∫ (𝜃 − 𝑝1)d𝜃
𝜃
?̃?
+ ∫ (𝜃𝑠 − 𝑝1)d𝜃
?̃?
?̂?
= (𝜃 − 𝑝1)𝜇 +
1
2
?̃?2 − 𝜃𝑝1 +
1
2
?̃?2(1 − 𝑠) −
1
2
?̂?2𝑠 + ?̂?𝑝2  
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4.2.2 Outcomes with NB pricing under Scenario B with Direct Competition (“BD”) 
We now consider the opposite extreme where, rather than the producer setting the NB price and 
taking all the profit on the sale of this good, it is the retailer that sets both the NB and SB prices 
and takes all the profit from both their sales.  In this case, the profit function for the retailer in 
pricing the NB and SB so that both can appeal in principle to Switchers along with the NB also 
serving Loyals is 
𝜋𝑅(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝1𝑞1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) + 𝑝2𝑞2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) = 𝑝1 (𝜇 + 𝜃 −
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
) + 𝑝2 (
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
−
𝑝2
𝑠
) 
Maximising with respective to 𝑝1and 𝑝2, the optimality conditions for the NB and SB price are 
𝑝1(𝑝2, 𝑠) =
1
2
(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃) + 𝑝2  ;    𝑝2(𝑝1, 𝑠) =
1
2
𝑠𝑝2 
Solving reveals the equilibrium pair of prices as 
𝑝1 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) =  
1
2
(1 + 𝛼)𝜃  <  𝜃 if  𝛼 < 1;  𝑝2(𝑠) =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃)𝑠 =
1
2
(1 + 𝛼)𝑠𝜃 
At these prices, the quantities sold of the NB and SB are 
𝑞1 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) > 𝜇 if  𝛼 ≝
𝜇
𝜃
< 1;  𝑞2 = 0 
Thus while the SB retail price might depend on 𝑠, the level of 𝑠 has no impact on the market 
outcomes.  In this case, regardless of the value of 𝑠, all sales go to the NB.  So, in effect, the SB 
serves merely as a “dummy product”.  It might be available to Switchers, but for these price levels 
those consumers who decide to buy a product all choose the NB over the SB.  With the retailer 
having full control over setting both retail prices it is able to internalise any externality effects 
that would otherwise arise if each product price were set independently.  Thus the retailer only 
requires one product, the NB, to extract as much surplus as possible from Switchers while also 
serving Loyals, and the other product, the SB, is completely superfluous as it makes no difference 
by its presence to the equilibrium prices and quantities or to the retailer’s profit which in this 
case is 𝜋𝑅 =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 , i.e. exactly the same as that achieved if the NB were the only product 
available (as shown in sub-section 3.2).   
So, under this pricing scenario, the presence of the SB has no effect on market outcomes and its 
quality position does not matter as the product is redundant.  The analogy is that it might be 
stocked by the retailer but it is effectively de-marketed and will just sit on the shelf while the NB 
makes all the sales.  So it might give the illusion of choice, but actually it serves no choice role. 
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4.2.3 Outcomes with NB pricing under Scenario C with Direct Competition (“CD”) 
Consider next the situation where the retailer sets both the NB and SB prices after the NB 
producer has set and committed to a wholesale price for the NB while taking into account that 
the retailer will be offering a SB of a known quality.  Formally, we model this as a three-stage 
game.  In Stage 1, the retailer introduces the SB with an assigned quality level, 𝑠.  In Stage 2, the 
NB producer sets the NB wholesale price, 𝑤.  In Stage 3, the retailer simultaneously determines 
the NB and SB retail prices.   
In Stage 3, for the given prior decisions over 𝑠 and 𝑤, the profit function for the retailer is 
𝜋𝑅(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑤, 𝑠) = (𝑝1 −𝑤)𝑞1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠) + 𝑝2𝑞2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑠)
= (𝑝1 −𝑤) (𝜇 + 𝜃 −
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
) + 𝑝2 (
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
1 − 𝑠
−
𝑝2
𝑠
) 
Maximising with respective to 𝑝1and 𝑝2, the optimality conditions for the NB and SB price are 
𝑝1(𝑝2, 𝑤, 𝑠) =
1
2
[(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃) + 𝑤 + 2𝑝2]  ;    𝑝2(𝑝1, 𝑤, 𝑠) =
1
2
𝑠(2𝑝1 −𝑤) 
Solving reveals the equilibrium pair of prices as 
𝑝1(𝑤) =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃 + 𝑤)  ;  𝑝2(𝑠) =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃)𝑠 
As with retail pricing under Scenario (B), by setting both retail prices the retailer internalises the 
externality effects that would otherwise arise under separate pricing of the two products and 
prices the goods in such a way as to ensure that combined sales are equal to the monopoly level 
with 𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃).  However, in respect of the individual quantities, they depend on 
the values of 𝑤 and 𝑠, and unlike where the NB was the only product available and its sales where 
increasing in 𝑤, when facing competition from the SB in the present situation the NB’s sales are 
decreasing in 𝑤: 
𝑞1(𝑤, 𝑠) =
1
2
[(𝜇 + 𝜃) − 
𝑤
1 − 𝑠
] ;   𝑞2(𝑤, 𝑠) =
1
2
[
𝑤
1 − 𝑠
] 
In anticipating this Stage 3 outcome from retail price setting, the producer in Stage 2 seeks to set 
the NB wholesale price to maximise the following profit function: 
𝜋𝑁1(𝑤, 𝑠) = 𝑤𝑞1(𝑤, 𝑠) =
𝑤
2
[(𝜇 + 𝜃) − 
𝑤
1 − 𝑠
] 
Maximising with respect to 𝑤 and solving for the profit maximising NB wholesale price reveals 
𝑤(𝑠) = 1
2
(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃) 
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Putting this value into the above Stage 3 outcomes shows that the NB and SB prices and quantities 
are respectively: 
𝑝1(𝑠) =
1
4
(3 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)  <  𝜃 if  𝛼 ≝
𝜇
𝜃
<
1−𝑠
3−𝑠
 ∈ (0, 1
3
 ] ;  𝑝2(𝑠) =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)𝑠 ; 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)  
Accordingly, the profit for the NB producer and retailer are respectively: 
𝜋𝑁1(𝑠) =
1
8
(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
2
   ;    𝜋𝑅(𝑠) =
1
16
(1 + 3𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
2
 
Comparing these outcomes to the monopoly situation where the NB was the only product choice 
(sub-section 3.2), we can see that the presence of the SB lowers the wholesale price and profit for 
the NB producer, other than when 𝑠 = 0 (which amounts to the retailer offering a product so 
inferior that it has to be given away at zero price and so has no competitive impact on the NB 
whatsoever).   In contrast, for the retailer, the introduction of the SB has a clearly positive effect 
on its profit, particularly as  𝑠 increases in value as this has the effect of allowing the SB retail 
price to be set higher while putting competitive pressure on the NB producer to lower its 
wholesale price, which also serves to lower the NB retail price but only to the extent of increasing 
the retailer’s profit margin on NB sales as the NB to SB retail price difference remains at least two 
fold.      
Taking account of these outcomes from Stages 2 and 3, when it comes to the retailer’s preference 
over SB quality it is evident that, with 𝜋𝑅(𝑠) strictly increasing in 𝑠, the retailer would like to set 
the SB quality as close as absolutely possible to the NB quality, ideally matching it.  In this way, it 
will push the NB producer’s profit down to zero and ensure that it captures all the available profits 
from extracting as much surplus as possible from Switchers in how it sets the NB and SB retail 
prices while ensuring that the NB retail price is sufficiently high as not to give away too much 
surplus to the Loyals.  However, this is not necessarily an equilibrium outcome, since the retailer 
would not expect the NB producer simply to accept its profits being stripped away in this fashion 
without retaliating.   We consider this issue in the next section of the paper where we derive the 
equilibrium outcomes and the retailer’s optimal choice of SB in taking account of how prices will 
be subsequently set.  
For completeness and ease of making comparisons, Table 4 summarises the results from this sub-
section. Superscripts AD, BD and CD respectively denote the equilibrium outcomes under each for 
Scenario (A, B or C) for this situation of direct competition (“D”) for Switchers. 
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Table 4 – Outcomes with Direct Competition between NB and SB 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Required 
conditions  
(𝑝1 < 𝜃  and 
𝑞1 > 𝜇) 
𝛼 ≝
𝜇
𝜃
<
2 − 𝑠
2
 ∈ [1,2) 
 
𝛼 ≝
𝜇
𝜃
< 1 𝛼 ≝
𝜇
𝜃
<
1 − 𝑠
3 − 𝑠
 ∈ (0,
1
3
 ] 
NB wholesale 
price 
𝑤𝐴𝐷 {
= 2(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)/(4 − 𝑠)
=
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃) for 𝑠 =
4
7
             
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1                          
 𝑤𝐵𝐷 = 0 𝑤𝐶𝐷 {=  
1
2
(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1           
 
NB retail 
price 
𝑝1
𝐴𝐷 {
= 2(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)/(4 − 𝑠)
=
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃) for 𝑠 =
4
7
             
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1                           
 𝑝1
𝐵𝐷 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) 𝑝1
𝐶𝐷 {
=  
1
4
(3 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)    
→
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) as 𝑠 → 1 
 
SB retail price 𝑝2
𝐴𝐷 {
= 𝑠(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)/(4 − 𝑠)
=
1
14
(𝜇 + 𝜃) for 𝑠 =
4
7
           
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1                         
 𝑝2
𝐵𝐷  {
=  
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃)𝑠               
→  
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) as 𝑠 → 1
 𝑝2
𝐶𝐷  {
=  
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃)𝑠                
→
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) as 𝑠 → 1 
 
NB sales 𝑞1
𝐴𝐷
{
 
 = 2(𝜇 + 𝜃)/(4 − 𝑠)      
=
7
12
(𝜇 + 𝜃) for 𝑠 =
4
7
    
→
2
3
(𝜇 + 𝜃) as 𝑠 → 1      
 𝑞1𝐵𝐷 =
1
2
(𝜇 + 𝜃) 𝑞1
𝐶𝐷 =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃) 
SB sales 𝑞2
𝐴𝐷
{
 
 = (𝜇 + 𝜃)/(4 − 𝑠)      
=
7
24
(𝜇 + 𝜃) for 𝑠 =
4
7
 
→
1
3
(𝜇 + 𝜃) as 𝑠 → 1   
 𝑞2𝐵𝐷 = 0 𝑞2
𝐶𝐷 =
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃) 
NB producer 
profit 
𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷 {
= 4(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)2/(4 − 𝑠)2
=
7
48
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 for 𝑠 =
4
7
            
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1                             
 𝜋𝑁𝐵𝐷 = 0 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐷 {=  
1
8
(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
2
 
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1              
 
Retailer profit 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐷 {
= 𝑠(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)2/(4 − 𝑠)2
=
1
48
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 for 𝑠 =
4
7
            
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1                             
 𝜋𝑅𝐵𝐷 =  
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐷 {
=
1
16
(1 + 3𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
2
 
→  
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 as 𝑠 → 1 
 
Total profit Π𝐴𝐷 {
= (4 + 𝑠)(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)2/(4 − 𝑠)2
=
1
6
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 for 𝑠 =
4
7
                          
→ 0 as 𝑠 → 1                                          
 Π𝐵𝐷 =  
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 Π𝐶𝐷 {
=
1
16
(3 + 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
2
   
→  
1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 as 𝑠 → 1
 
Consumer 
Surplus 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷 {
=  
1
24
(7?̅?2 − 5𝜇2 + 14𝜃𝜇) for 𝑠 =
4
7
→
1
2
(?̅?2 + 𝜇2 + 4𝜃𝜇) as 𝑠 → 1          
 𝐶𝑆𝐵𝐷 = 1
8
(𝜃 − 𝜇)(𝜃 + 3𝜇) 𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝐷 →
1
8
(𝜃 − 𝜇)(𝜃 + 3𝜇) 
                                         as 𝑠 → 1 
Total Welfare 𝑇𝑊𝐴𝐷 {
=  
1
24
(11?̅?2 − 𝜇2 + 22𝜃𝜇) for 𝑠 =
4
7
 
→
1
2
(?̅?2 + 𝜇2 + 4𝜃𝜇) as 𝑠 → 1           
 𝑇𝑊𝐵𝐷 = 1
8
(3?̅?2 − 𝜇2 + 6𝜃𝜇) 𝑇𝑊
𝐶𝐷 →
1
8
(3?̅?2 − 𝜇2 + 6𝜃𝜇) 
                                        as 𝑠 → 1 
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5. Store Brand Quality Choice and Equilibrium Outcomes 
The results from the two previous sections show the outcomes from essentially twelve different 
cases as the different combinations arising from (i) either the NB is the only available product 
(“NB monopoly”) or where both the NB and SB are available (“NB and SB duopoly”), (ii) the NB is 
priced to appeal either only to Loyals (“segmentation” and “indirect competition”) or both Loyals 
and Switchers (“non-exclusion” and “direct competition”), and (iii) for three different retail 
pricing scenarios (“A”, “B” or “C”).  Given these different outcomes resulting from how prices are 
set in the market for each of the twelve cases, in this section we consider the equilibrium market 
outcomes based on the retailer’s decision as to whether it would want to offer an SB and if so how 
it would seek to position the SB relative to the NB in respect of setting the SB quality level in a 
fashion that would serve its best interests in maximising its profit.  We do this by considering the 
retailer as moving first in setting the SB quality level (should it desire to offer an SB) in knowledge 
and anticipation of the subsequent pricing outcomes that would arise respectively under each of 
the three different pricing scenarios.  
With this sequential structure in mind then, in identifying the sub-game perfect equilibrium 
outcomes, the retailer has effectively the final say on outcomes by moving first in determining its 
store brand quality level, since in doing so it sets in train the process by which market outcomes 
will be determined by reasoning ahead and then working backwards.  So in selecting SB quality, 
the retailer will take into account how this decision will affect its interaction with the NB producer, 
whether and by how this will mean that the consumer types will or will not be segmented, and 
ultimately what the consumers will buy based on the eventual NB and SB prices set according to 
the three different retail pricing scenarios (as summarised in Tables 2-4 above).   
In selecting SB quality, we can consider two different possibilities in respect of the flexibility and 
scope the retailer has for setting SB quality relative to NB quality.  First, we take the case where 
the retailer has complete freedom and ability to set freely and without cost whatever SB quality 
level, 𝑠, suits its own interest for the full range of viable quality levels between zero quality (i.e. 
utterly useless as far as consumers are concerned) and perfectly matching the NB quality at unity, 
i.e. 𝑠 ∈ [0,1].  Secondly, to give some further consideration and nuance to the effect of the SB 
quality choice on market outcomes, we consider the situation where the retailer is constrained in 
how high it can set SB quality, either because of a technological obstacle limiting the ability of the 
SB supplier to make a high quality SB (e.g. non-availability of the same high quality inputs as used 
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by the NB or an inability to replicate the formula and performance of the NB) or a perception 
obstacle (e.g. inability to replicate brand image, reputation and consumer trust of the NB). In this 
constrained SB quality case, we consider the retailer’s restricted choice of selecting SB quality 
where the maximum value of 𝑠 is ?̅? (< 1), i. e. 𝑠 ∈ [0, ?̅?] .  We proceed by determining the 
equilibrium SB quality choice and market outcomes for each of the three pricing scenarios in turn. 
 
5.1 Equilibrium outcomes in Scenario A 
In this pricing scenario, where the NB producer sets the NB retail price and captures all the profits 
on the sales of the NB, then the retailer earns zero profit under NB monopoly so stands to gain by 
developing an SB under its pricing control and earn profit on the sales that the SB makes.  Thus, 
for the retailer it will be considering when it determines the SB quality choice the amount of 
positive profit it will earn under indirect competition (i. e.  𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐼) and direct competition (i.e. 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐷).  
From the values reported in Table 3 and 3, we can observe a stark difference in the effect of s on 
the retailer’s profit.  With indirect competition and targeted segmentation then the retailer’s 
profit is strictly increasing in s and is at its maximum with 𝑠 = 1,where  𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐼 = 1
4
?̅?2. In contrast, 
with direct competition and both the NB and SB competing for Switchers then the retailer’s profit 
is concave in s, being at or approaching zero when respectively 𝑠 = 0 and 𝑠 → 1 , and at a 
maximum when 𝑠 = 4
7
 , where 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐷 = 1
48
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 = 1
48
(1 + 𝛼)2?̅?2.  In comparing these two levels 
of profits at the respective levels of s, then 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐷 = 1
12
(11 − 2𝛼 − 𝛼2)?̅?2 > 0  if 𝛼 < 2√3 −
1 ≈ 2.4641.  So the only possibility with these respective values of s for retailer profit to be higher 
with direct competition is when 𝛼 is very high (> 2.4641).  However, this level of  𝛼 is ruled out 
because it exceeds the threshold where the NB would serve both segments, i.e. the requirement 
that 𝑞1
𝐴𝐷 > 𝜇  which is only satisfied if < 2/(2 − 𝑠)  ∈ [1,2) .  Accordingly, with a free and 
unrestricted choice, the retailer will opt to set 𝑠 = 1 and look to achieve a profit of 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐼 = 1
4
?̅?2 with 
the SB serving the Switchers and the NB targeted solely at the Loyals.  Also, we can see that the 
NB producer will oblige the retailer in this respect because it would face the stark choice of 
earning zero profits by competing for Switchers (noting 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷 = 4(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)2/(4 − 𝑠)2 →
0 as 𝑠 → 1) or earning positive profit by setting the NB at the reservation price of the Loyals and 
serving just them (and so gaining 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐼 = 𝜇𝜃 > 0) and leaving the SB on its own to serve the 
Switchers.   
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Next, consider the situation where the retailer is constrained in the level of SB quality it can set 
then 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐼 > 𝜋𝑅
𝐴𝐷 for any non-zero value of s.  This can readily be seen since the SB sells more and 
at a higher price under segmentation when it does not face direct competition for the custom of 
Switchers, which would entail sharing sales with the NB and having to compete on price.  Here 
we can note that 𝑞2
𝐴𝐼 − 𝑞2
𝐴𝐷 = (2 − 𝑠 − 2𝛼)𝜃/(2(4 − 𝑠)) > 0  for 𝛼 < (2 − 𝑠)/2  which is the 
same condition required for 𝑞2
𝐴𝐷 > 𝜇 .  Also 𝑝2
𝐴𝐼 − 𝑝2
𝐴𝐷 = 𝑠(2 + 𝑠 − (1 − 𝑠)2𝛼)𝜃/(2(4 − 𝑠)) >
0  for 𝛼 < (2 + 𝑠)/(2(1 − 𝑠)) which is the same condition required for 𝑝1
𝐴𝐷 < 𝜃.  Accordingly, the 
retailer will in all circumstances prefer segmentation over direct competition. 
Thus the retailer’s preference for segmentation is very clear, but for the NB producer its preferred 
outcome will depend on trading off the security of extracting all the surplus from Loyals under 
segmentation against the benefit of extending its sales to cover Switchers as well with direct 
competition, but tempered by the fact that this will give rise to price competition with the SB, so 
decrease the profit margin on sales.  Here, in contrast to the effect of s on the respective profit 
levels for the retailer, the NB producer’s profit with segmentation is independent of s, as 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐼 =
𝜇𝜃 = 𝛼?̅?2, but is strictly decreasing in s when it faces direct competition with the SB for Switchers, 
as  𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷 = 4(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)2/(4 − 𝑠)2  =  4(1 − 𝑠)(1 + 𝛼)2?̅?2/(4 − 𝑠)2 .  Noting that both profit 
levels are increasing in 𝛼, the difference between the two is 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷 = [𝛼𝑠2 + 4𝑠(1 + 𝛼2) −
4(1 − 𝛼)2]?̅?2/(4 − 𝑠)2. Denoting the critical level of s where 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐼 = 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷 as 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 then 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐼 > 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷 if 
𝑠 > 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = 2[(1 + 𝛼)√(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼2) − 𝛼2 − 1]/𝛼.  This condition is at its maximum with 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 → 1 as 
𝛼 → 0, decreasing and concave in the range of 𝛼 < 1, at its minimum with 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = 0 when 𝛼 = 1 
then increasing for 𝛼 > 1.  However, bearing in mind that for 𝑞1
𝐴𝐷 > 𝜇 (so at least some positive 
number of Switchers are served by the NB) requires 𝛼 < 2/(2 − 𝑠) and observing the tightness 
of this condition, the 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 condition is only relevant for 𝛼 ≤ 1. For situations where  𝛼 > 1 then we 
can take it that the relative size of the Loyals consumer segment is sufficient to ensure that 
𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐼 > 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷. Thus only when the proportion of Loyals is small will the NB producer entertain the 
prospect of competing directly with the SB for sales to Switchers, and this becomes less attractive 
the higher is the SB quality since this intensifies the competition between the NB and SB.   
As shown above, when the retailer has unrestricted choice in setting s then it will set 𝑠 = 1 as this 
maximises its profit under segmentation and obliges the NB producer to also follow suit and price 
for segmentation.  However, if the retailer is restricted in how high it can set s then it may find 
that the NB producer prefers direct competition over segmentation.  For the retailer, to ensure 
that the NB producer opts for segmentation over direct competition, then it has to set 𝑠 > 𝑠𝑁
𝐴.   For 
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𝛼 > 1 this is achieved by the required price and quantity conditions under direct competition, but 
for 𝛼 < 1 then the critical level of s increases at an increasing rate as 𝛼 declines, where in the limit 
𝑠𝑁
𝐴 → 1 as 𝛼 → 0.  To illustrate the effect of  𝛼 decreasing, for 𝛼 = 3
4
 then 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = (7√13 − 25)/6 ≈
0.0398 , for 𝛼 = 1
2
 then 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = 3√3 − 5 ≈ 0.1962 , for 𝛼 = 1
4
 then 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = (5√13 − 17)/2 ≈ 0.5139 , 
and for 𝛼 = 1
10
 then 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = (11√91 − 101)/5 ≈ 0.7867.   
If the retailer is able to set SB quality to exceed 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 then it should set the level as high as possible 
to maximise its profits under market segmentation.  However, if the retailer is restricted in its 
choice of s and cannot meet the required critical value of 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 then its chosen level of s will trigger 
the NB producer to price for direct competition.  In these circumstances, the retailer should set s 
as high as possible up to the level of 𝑠 = 4
7
 , as exceeding that level will decrease its profit under 
direct competition.  Here the critical level of 𝛼 for 𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = 4
7
 is 𝛼 = (17 − 4√15)/7 ≈ 0.2154, so that 
for lower values of 𝛼 then the retailer should set restrict SB quality to 𝑠 = 4
7
 if direct competition 
is inevitable (as setting a higher level of s will diminish its profit) while for values of 𝛼 that exceed 
this critical level then the retailer should set s as high as it can towards 𝑠 = 4
7
. 
In summary, the retailer’s optimal strategy in choosing SB quality is to set the quality level as high 
as possible with 𝑠 = 1 or, if constrained, the maximum level it can set, ?̅?, as long as ?̅? > 𝑠𝑁
𝐴.  In 
these circumstances, it presents the NB producer with a game of chicken where it has moved and 
committed first in setting a high SB quality forcing the NB producer to opt for segmentation in 
order to avoid profit destroying direct competition.  Only when the retailer is very restricted in 
how high it can set s and when the proportion of Loyals is very small, so the NB producer is eager 
to sell to Switchers, will this strategy not be feasible. Then, with ?̅? < 𝑠𝑁
𝐴, the retailer’s best strategy 
is to accommodate the inevitable direct competition by setting s in a manner that balances its 
interest in setting quality high enough to allow it to allow it to price positively to attract Switchers 
but not so high as to bring it to a point where the lack of differentiation with the NB  results in 
destructive head-to-head competition, and its ideal balance is 𝑠 = 4
7
.   
In short, under this pricing scenario, the retailer will want to avoid direct competition for 
Switchers and so has a very strong incentive to ensure that it is able to set SB quality 
unrestrictedly, and then ideally it will position the SB exactly to match the NB’s quality and in this 
way force a situation where the NB only serves Loyals while the SB is left uncontested to serve 
Switchers. 
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5.2 Equilibrium outcomes in Scenario B 
In contrast to Scenario A where each party in setting its own product price needs to take account 
of the other party’s position and interests, in Scenario B the retailer has complete control over 
both the NB and SB prices and captures all available profits in the market.  In this case, the retailer 
does not have to give any consideration to the NB producer’s preferences and will simply act to 
maximise the combined profits on sales from the NB and SB.    
In this setting, the benefit of having an SB is to serve as a complement to the NB, where they can 
work in tandem for the retailer’s interest as a price discrimination mechanism to extract as much 
surplus as possible from the two different consumer segments, with the NB targeted at Loyals 
and leaving the SB for the Switchers.  In this regard, the retailer is essentially a multi-product 
monopolist, where the NB is a monopoly product serving Loyals and the SB is a monopoly product 
serving Switchers.  This works at its optimum when 𝑠 = 1, so that the SB quality exactly matches 
the NB quality (as viewed by Switchers), and the retailer can then use segmentation to extract all 
the surplus from Loyals and as much as possible from Switchers. In contrast, the alternative 
outcomes involve using the NB on its own either to serve just Loyals (when 𝛼 ≥ 1)  or both 
segments (when 𝛼 < 1), but this respectively leaves behind profits that could be made on sales 
to Switchers or surplus that could be extracted from Loyals.  Specifically, when 𝑠 = 1 then for 𝛼 ≥
1 the profit difference is 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐼 − 𝜋𝑁
𝐵𝑀 = 1
4
?̅?2 > 0 and for 𝛼 < 1 the profit difference is 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐼 − 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝑀(=
𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐷) = 1
4
𝛼(2 − 𝛼)?̅?2 > 0. 
If, though, the retailer is constrained in how high it can set SB quality, this will affect how much 
surplus it can extract from Switchers.  Constrained to a maximum of ?̅? then for 𝛼 ≥ 1, at any non-
zero level of SB quality, i.e. ?̅? > 0, even a low quality SB offers additional profit (noting𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐼 −
𝜋𝑁
𝐵𝑀 = 1
4
𝑠?̅?2 > 0).  However, for 𝛼 < 1 then there is a trade-off between segmenting consumers 
to leave the NB to extract all the available surplus from Loyals but only a limited amount from the 
Switchers with the SB (because of its low quality) against using the NB to serve both segments 
and using this to extract more surplus from Switchers but foregoing some from Loyals.  The profit 
difference for the retailer is 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐼 − 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝑀(= 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐷) = 1
4
(2𝛼 − 𝛼2 − 1 + 𝑠)?̅?2.   Denoting the 
corresponding boundary condition as 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 = 1 − 2𝛼 + 𝛼2 then segmentation offers greater profit, 
i.e. 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐼 > 𝜋𝑅
𝐵𝐷 , if ?̅? > 𝑠𝑅
𝐵, otherwise the retailer would be better off with just using the NB to serve 
both segments and either choose not to offer an SB (as with NB monopoly case examined in 
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section 3.2) or offer the SB but de-market it and over price it in such a way that it does not attract 
any sales (as with the direct competition case examined in section 4.2.2). 
We can observe that the requirement on 𝑠𝑅
𝐵  is strictly declining and at a decreasing rate (i.e. 
convex) in 𝛼  for 𝛼 < 1 , such that 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 → 0 as 𝛼 → 1 and 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 → 1 as 𝛼 → 0.  Thus the restriction 
becomes tighter the lower is  𝛼, since this means the retailer’s profit is relatively more dependent 
on the amount of surplus that can be extracted from the Switchers, as sales to and thus surplus 
from the Loyals shrinks.  To illustrate the effect of  𝛼 decreasing, for 𝛼 = 3
4
 then 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 = 1
16
= 0.0625, 
for 𝛼 = 1
2
 then 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 = 1
4
= 0.25 , for 𝛼 = 1
4
 then 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 = 9
16
= 0.5625 , and for 𝛼 = 1
10
 then 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 = 81
100
=
0.81. 
In summary, in this pricing scenario, the retailer’s strategy is to maximise the level of SB quality, 
ideally to the point where it exactly matches the NB quality with 𝑠 = 1, and then use segmentation 
with the NB targeted at Loyals and the SB targeted at Switchers to extract as much surplus as 
possible from these two different consumer segments.  If, though, the retailer is constrained in 
the quality level it can set for the SB then it will still use this segmentation strategy as long as it 
can set 𝑠 to meet the requirement of ?̅? > 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 = 1 − 2𝛼 + 𝛼2, which always holds for 𝛼 > 1 with 
?̅? > 0 , but will be binding for 𝛼 < 1  and require higher levels of  ?̅?   for smaller 𝛼 .  If the 
requirement on 𝑠𝑅
𝐵 cannot be met then the retailer will rely simply on the NB to make all sales. 
 
5.3 Equilibrium outcomes in Scenario C 
In Scenario C, with leader-follower wholesale-then-retail price setting, the retailer will have to 
bear in mind when determining SB quality that the NB producer can always secure monopoly 
profits over the Loyals by setting 𝑤 = 𝜃  and so obliging the retailer to set  𝑝1 = 𝜃 , and then 
leaving the SB to serve Switchers.  In that case, the retailer will earn 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐼 = 1
4
?̅?2𝑠, which is strictly 
increasing in s and at its maximum when 𝑠 = 1.  If the retailer is able to set 𝑠 = 1 then this profit 
is more than it would earn under NB monopoly, where for 𝛼 ≥ 1
3
 then 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝑀 = 0 and for 𝛼 < 1
3
 then 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝑀 = 1
16
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 < 1
9
?̅?2.  However, if the retailer were constrained in how high it could set SB 
quality then the latter profit condition would take on take on significance and would require a 
minimum level of s, which we can denote as 𝑠𝐶 , such that using the SB with segmentation would 
offer more profit where 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐼 − 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝑀 = 1
16
(4𝑠 − 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝛼2)?̅?2  > 0 if 𝑠 > 𝑠𝐶 = 1
4
(1 + 𝛼)2. Here,  𝑠𝐶  
is increasing and convex in 𝛼, and at minimum with 𝑠𝐶 → 1
4
 as 𝛼 → 0 and at maximum with 𝑠𝐶 →
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4
9
 as 𝛼 → 1.  Thus as long as the retailer is able to set a minimum of 𝑠 = 4
9
= 0. 4̇4̇ then it will always 
be profitable to develop the SB and target it at Switchers if the NB is targeted at Loyals compared 
to allowing the NB to serve both consumer segments on its own. 
However, we have yet to consider the NB producer’s response to the presence of a SB.  Here it can 
either forego serving the Switchers and focus on the Loyals, extracting all the surplus from them 
and securing a profit of 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐼 = 𝜇?̅?, or it can choose to compete for Switchers, in which case its 
profit will be 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐷 = 1
8
(1 − 𝑠)(𝜇 + 𝜃)
2
.  The former is independent of s while the latter is strictly 
decreasing in s, and in the limit 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐷 → 0 as 𝑠 → 1.   The reason for the latter effect is that with 
direct competition the retailer can use the SB quality along with the SB’s zero wholesale price as 
a means to control the NB producer and ensure it sets a low wholesale price (where 𝑤𝐶𝑁 → 0 as  
𝑠 → 1), which it will be required to do in order for the NB to remain competitive relative to the 
SB in competing for Switchers.  This will be a very attractive outcome for the retailer and its own 
profit is maximised under direct competition by setting the SB quality to be as close as possible 
to that of the NB quality, where 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐷 →  1
4
(𝜇 + 𝜃)2 as 𝑠 → 1, so allowing it to take all the available 
joint profit.   
Clearly, while desirable for the retailer, this will be an outcome that the NB producer would seek 
to avoid.  In this regard, competing for Switchers becomes a trap that the NB producer would 
want to escape and the way to do this would be to ensure that the NB is only targeted at Loyals 
with the segmentation outcomes discussed above by setting 𝑤 = 𝜃 and so pushing the retailer to 
set 𝑝1 = 𝜃.  Accordingly, we can see that if the retailer were to set 𝑠 = 1 then the equilibrium 
outcome would be targeted segmentation with the retailer earning 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐼 = 1
4
?̅?2  and the NB 
producer earning 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐼 = 𝜇?̅?.  
If, though, the retailer were constrained in its choice of s then for any given level of s the difference 
in the NB producer’s profit between direct and indirect competition is 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐷 − 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐼 = 1
8
[1 − 6𝛼 +
𝛼2 − 𝑠(1 + 𝛼)2]?̅?2. Denoting the critical value of s where 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐷 = 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐼 as 𝑠𝑁
𝐶  then 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐷 > 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐼 if 𝑠 <
𝑠𝑁
𝐴 = 1 − 8𝛼/(1 + 𝛼)2 .  This condition is decreasing and concave in 𝛼 , being at its maximum 
with 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 → 1 as 𝛼 → 0 and at a minimum with 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 = 0 when 𝛼 = 3 − 2√2 ≈ 0.1716, so only if the 
proportion of Loyals is particularly small will the NB producer benefit in competing directly with 
the SB for Switchers, and less so the higher is s.  For example, for 𝛼 = 1
10
 then 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 = 41
121
≈ 0.3388, 
for 𝛼 = 1
20
 then 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 = 281
441
≈ 0.6372, and 𝛼 = 1
50
 then 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 = 2201
2601
≈ 0.8462. 
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The corresponding profit comparison for the retailer reveals that it has a strict preference for 
direct competition over segmentation, since 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐷 − 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐼 = 1
8
[1 − 𝑠 + (1 + 3𝑠)(2𝛼 + 𝛼2)]?̅?2 > 0 .  
Here, the benefit for the retailer of NB and SB direct competition is while it foregoes some SB sales 
to Switchers (compared to when the SB captures all Switcher sales with segmentation) it gains a 
profit margin on all the NB sales (where it has a zero margin on NB sales with segmentation) 
making its overall profit higher.  Accordingly, the retailer has a strong vested interest in trying to 
encourage the NB producer to engage in direct competition rather than segmentation.  This is 
only possible if the retailer sets 𝑠 < 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 , and a necessary condition is that 𝛼 < 3 − 2√2 ≈ 0.1716.  
In these circumstances, though, other than by coincidence if ?̅? = 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 ,  the retailer will be conflicted 
between the desire to set s as high as possible, which increases its profit under both direct and 
indirect competition, and limiting the SB quality to ensure that the NB producer opts for direct 
competition rather than indirect competition with segmentation. 
To consider how this conflict plays out, take the situation where the retailer is capped in the level 
of s it can set to ensure that the NB producer goes for direct competition by restraining SB quality 
to 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑁
𝐶  compared to setting SB quality at the maximum possible level it can set with 𝑠 = ?̅? ≡
𝑠𝑁
𝐶 + 𝜎 < 1, where 𝜎 is the gap in quality between the limit value and the maximum it could set, 
but then have to contend with segmentation.  In this situation, the retailer’s difference in profit 
will be 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐷(𝑠𝑁
𝐶) − 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝐼(?̅?) = [𝛼(4 − 7𝛼 − 2𝛼2 + 𝛼3) − 𝜎(1 + 𝛼)2]?̅?2/(1 + 𝛼)2 > 0  if 𝜎 < [𝛼(4 −
7𝛼 − 2𝛼2 + 𝛼3)]/(1 + 𝛼)2, where this condition is concave in 𝛼, being at a minimum with 𝜎 = 0 
when 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛼 ≈  0.5151 and positive for in-between values of 𝛼 , with a maximum at 𝜎 ≈
0.3516  when 𝛼 ≈  0.2089 .  Accordingly, there is some – albeit quite limited – scope for the 
retailer to set a lower level of SB quality less than its capability in order to ensure that the NB 
producer will also have a preference for direct competition.33  The scope is restricted to very low 
levels of 𝛼 and also 𝜎 being small, otherwise the retailer will prefer to set the SB quality at its 
maximum, ?̅?, and push the NB producer into opting for market segmentation.  
In summary, this pricing scenario, with wholesale-then-retail pricing, is more complicated than 
the previous two considered scenarios because in this case the retailer has a strict preference for 
direct competition, which serves as an effective means to force the NB producer to lower its 
wholesale price and allow the retailer to capture more of the available total profit.   This retailer 
                                                          
33 To use the above values of 𝛼 as illustrations, when 𝛼 = 1
10
 and 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 = 41
121
≈ 0.3388 then 𝜎 < 3281
12100
≈ 0.2716, 
for 𝛼 = 1
20
 and 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 = 281
441
≈ 0.6372  then 𝜎 < 29161
176400
≈ 0.1653 , and 𝛼 = 1
50
 and 𝑠𝑁
𝐶 = 2201
2601
≈ 0.8462  then  𝜎 <
482401
6502500
≈ 0.0742. 
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desire becomes more pronounced the closer is the SB to the NB in quality terms, but the NB 
producer always has the option of going for market segmentation by setting its wholesale price 
at the reservation price of the Loyals.  The retailer then has to decide whether it should 
strategically limit how high it sets the SB quality level as a way to subdue the intensity of direct 
competition or to set the maximum possible level of SB quality and accept that this might trigger 
the NB producer going for market segmentation.   The above analysis shows that only for a very 
restricted set of parameter values (with a necessary condition that 𝛼 < 0.1716  and tighter 
sufficient conditions on 𝛼  as s increases) will the strategic profit sacrifice be worthwhile and 
otherwise the retailer will have to accept the profit under segmentation and seek to maximise 
this level by setting s as high as possible, and ideally at s = 1 to exactly match the NB quality. 
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6. Discussion 
6.1 Comparisons across the different pricing scenarios 
The equilibrium outcomes for all three scenarios show that the retailer has a keen interest to 
develop a store brand and generally ensure that its quality is set as close as possible to that of the 
national brand.   However, the reasons and motives are subtly different between the three 
scenarios.   
In Scenario A, the NB producer controls the NB’s price and sales and, in the absence of the SB, 
takes all the profits, so the SB offers the retailer a means to make profits which are maximised 
when it can force, through the threat of profit-destroying direct competition, the NB producer to 
retreat to just serving Loyals and thereby leaving the SB to take all the sales from Switchers.   This 
competitive threat increases as SB quality increases but higher SB quality also serves to ensure 
in the resulting segmented market structure that the retailer is best placed to set a high price and 
extract as much surplus as possible from Switchers and so maximise its profits.  Thus the purpose 
of the SB is a tool for shifting profits and to wrestle away market control from the NB producer, 
where the retailer will favour the SB over the NB because it offers a higher (positive) margin 
compared to the (zero) margin on the NB. 
In Scenario B, and in complete contrast, the retailer controls the NB’s price and sales and takes all 
the profits.  In this case, the role of the SB is as a price discrimination device to work in tandem 
with the NB to extract more surplus from consumers than the NB could achieve on its own.  The 
added value of the SB for the retailer is that rather than have to pitch an averaging price for the 
NB to serve both Loyals and Switchers (and so losing some surplus from Loyal and losing some 
sales to Switchers), it can target the NB at Loyals with a precise price to extract all their surplus 
and target the SB at Switchers with a lower price (knowing that Loyals will still not buy the SB) 
to generate higher sales and extract more surplus from them. 
In Scenario C, and representing a more intermediate case where both parties have a degree of 
market power in a successive pricing structure, the presence of a high quality SB works as a tool 
for bargaining leverage restraining the NB producer in the wholesale price it can charge if it wants 
to serve both consumer segments by forcing it to concede on its margin to remain competitive on 
retail price or obliging it to accept segmentation and just serving Loyals and leaving the SB to 
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serve Switchers.  Either way, the high quality SB in serving Switchers will also serve as a tool for 
expanding category sales by alleviating double marginalisation if the NB serves Switchers or 
increasing total sales if otherwise Switchers would be excluded when only the NB is available. 
Accordingly, each scenario paints a slightly different picture for the reason the retailer will want 
to develop a high quality store brand.   In each scenario, the retailer has to contend with the NB 
having guaranteed exclusive sales to Loyals but it can use this brand loyalty to its advantage by 
forcing the NB producer either to focus on this segment but then exclude itself from potentially 
high sales to Switchers or face having to compete directly with the SB for Switchers and earn less 
margin.   If the NB did not have this secure market with Loyals then it would have to fight for sales 
with the SB over Switchers, but in having this security and not wanting to forgo these profits on 
Loyals then the brand loyalty for the NB opens the door for the SB to seize complete control over 
sales to Switchers.  Thus brand loyalty is a double edged sword for the NB producer, as it offers a 
secure profit but in the process means that it will be less willing to sacrifice this to take on the SB 
and fight for additional customers.  Knowing this, the retailer can be very aggressive in choosing 
its SB quality to match the NB quality, forcing the NB producer into a “fight-or-flight” response, 
where “flight” will generally be the more attractive option allowing the NB producer to avoid 
profit destroying direct competition but in the process acquiescing to consumer segmentation.    
 
6.2 Strategic implications for industry participants 
With these results in mind, we can see why retailers will be keen to improve SB quality and 
increase SB sales and why they might relentlessly strive to match NB quality with SB equivalents.  
To this end, retailers will be encouraging their store brand producers to overcome any technical, 
input requirement or production problems that could prevent the SB matching the performance 
(including taste, look and/or feel) and formula/composition of the NB.  Also, we can see why 
retailers might be inclined to deliberately use a “lookalike” strategy for SBs to mimic the look, 
presentation and image of leading NBs when perceived quality differences (including from 
packaging design, brand logos and associated brand imagery) remain despite the absence of any 
notable physical quality differences.   
The issue of SB lookalikes has become a hotbed of contention and running source of friction 
between NB producers and retailers developing copycat SBs (Johnson et al 2013; Dobson and 
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Zhou 2014).  For NB producers, they wish to protect brand identity and distinctiveness and not 
have retailers develop SBs that free-ride on the brand investments that they have made to build 
up consumer goodwill and trust in the brand.  Equally, for retailers they might view developing 
lookalike SBs as fair game in ensuring that consumers are given the best possible quality of SB 
products to ensure SB comparability with the NB and benefit quality-conscious and value-
conscious consumers alike in making their product choices.   
However, our analysis gives an interesting perspective on deeper reasons for their different 
stances.  For the NB producer, brand loyalty offers security on profits and so it will be eager to 
maintain that security and ensure that it remains indispensable to the retailer, i.e. the NB cannot 
be delisted and not stocked without the retailer losing sales and perhaps brand loyal customers 
shopping elsewhere.  In contrast, the retailer will be keen to substitute sales of NBs with sales of 
SBs, but only so long as this allows for higher margins and total profits to be made.  If NB brand 
loyalty is weakened then this can work to the retailer’s advantage when the threat of intense 
competition with the copycat SB forces the NB producer to lower its wholesale price.  However, 
if taken too far, this will mean that the retailer will lose a valuable price discrimination tool in 
how the NB and SB are perceived and which allows it to separate quality- and value-conscious 
consumers by targeted pricing and in the process extract more consumer surplus.34 
The latter aspect also has relevance in terms of how far retailers might be prepared to go with 
switching marketing and “compare and save” advertising campaigns backed up by in-store 
promotions, blind taste tests, brand delisting trials, and more favourable SB shelf-space allocation 
and positioning as a means to encourage consumers to switch away from NBs to equivalent SBs.35  
This can benefit the retailer if it increases SB quality perceptions and in the longer term allows it 
to increase SB prices, but if all it does is to encourage consumers to trade down and buy cheaper 
products then such marketing runs the risk of making consumers more price conscious and 
prepared to pay less for goods and so take value out of the market. 
In respect of developing lookalikes and using switch marketing tactics to favour SBs over NBs, the 
retailer has to balance the desire to raise the perceived quality of the SB and encourage trial to 
                                                          
34 Even so, the emergence of multi-tier store branding offering “good, better, best” choices, e.g. with budget, 
standard and premium private labels, means that retailers are increasingly capable of just using store 
brands pitched at different quality tiers to segment consumers. On the practicalities and effectiveness of 
this strategy, see Kumar and Steenkamp (2007, chapter 5) and Geyskens et al (2010). 
35 For examples of switch marketing, see http://idei.fr/doc/conf/inra/2011/dobson2%20table%20ronde.pdf. 
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gain increased SB sales against undermining NBs and damaging brand equity so that they lose 
their cachet with high-value consumers.  Given the very significant advancement of broad-based 
SB portfolios by retailers and the increasing ability and wherewithal of SB suppliers to replicate 
the physical quality of NBs (and indeed even the image quality when placed under a reputable 
retailer premium umbrella brand) then it might come as a surprise why SBs have not completely 
replaced NBs.  Certainly many secondary brands with limited brand loyalty have been replaced 
by SBs.36  However, our analysis suggests the continuing presence of category-leading NBs is 
because they do remain indispensable to retailers, in being able to satisfy particularly choosy and 
exacting customers as well as serving as a useful device to segment consumers, but can be much 
more effectively controlled and tamed when the retailer is able to develop quality-equivalent SBs.  
In this sense, rather than the traditional view of a retailer as merely a brand producer’s agent 
serving as its distributor, the power relationship could go the other way with the brand producer 
being the retailer’s agent, played off against other suppliers and needing the retailer as the 
gatekeeper it has to go through if its products are to reach final consumers.  The only defence for 
the NB in these circumstances is to ensure that it remains indispensable. This requires a two-fold 
investment effort in firstly continuing to invest in quality improvements and product 
distinctiveness to keep one step ahead of SB copycats while taking a tough enforcement stance 
against lookalikes to protect its intellectual property and secondly continually investing in 
maintaining brand loyalty and building its loyal customer base.37 
6.3 Implications for consumers 
Thus far we have only discussed how the market outcomes affect the industry players and have 
yet to comment on how consumer welfare is affected by the interplay of the NB and SB.  Tables 2-
4 report the consumer surplus levels in each pricing scenario for respectively NB monopoly, 
NB/SB indirect competition with segmentation, and NB/SB direct competition.  In principle, 
consumers stand to gain by the introduction of the SB as offering both choice and competition 
                                                          
36 Kumar and Steenkamp (2007, pp. 186-8) and Bell (2009) provide examples and evidence on the squeeze 
on secondary brands at category level. Also, Walmart has been quite open about delisting secondary brands, 
e.g. Steiner (2004, p.112) and Berg and Roberts (2012, p. 98).  Its UK subsidiary, Asda, has been operating 
brand delisting trials to test whether consumers will miss the absence of secondary brands (Leyland 2007; 
Smith 2009).  For a theoretical model showing why SBs replace secondary NBs, see Scott Morton and 
Zettelmeyer (2004). 
37  Kumar and Steenkamp (2007, chapter 12) provide a wealth of examples on where such brand 
investments should be directed.  
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with the NB for their custom, and the more so the higher is the quality of the SB.  However, as we 
have seen, the market outcome under each pricing scenario is likely to be segmentation with the 
retailer using the NB and SB as price discrimination devices to strip Loyals of all surplus and 
restrict Switchers’ surplus and in this case consumers could be even worse off than in aggregate 
terms than when the NB was the only choice.  [Specifically, if under NB monopoly both segments 
are served, requiring 𝛼 < 1  for Scenarios A and B and 𝛼 < 1
3
 for Scenario C, then consumer 
surplus will be more in Scenarios A and B compared to segmentation unless 𝑠 > (1 − 𝛼)(1 + 3𝛼) 
(where it is sufficient for 𝛼 < 2
3
 even with s = 1) and more in Scenario C (and despite the double 
marginalisation) unless 𝑠 > (1 − 3𝛼)(1 + 5𝛼) (where it is sufficient for 𝛼 < 2
15
 even with s = 1).   
In contrast, consumers would be better off with direct competition, at least for Scenarios A and C, 
where in competing head-to-head for Switchers, both consumer segments gain from lower prices.  
Yet, such possibilities only arise in two circumstances.  In Scenario A, the benefits of direct 
competition will only flow to consumers if the retailer is sufficiently constrained in how high it 
can set SB quality such that the NB producer is still prepared to price the NB at a level which will 
allow it to directly compete for Switchers, which in the process benefits Loyals.  The conditions 
for this case are shown in section 5.1 and essentially require the value of 𝛼 to be low so the NB 
producer would otherwise be greatly restricted in its sales if it only sold to Loyals and s to be 
sufficiently low to constrain the intensity of direct head-to-head competition in the NB producer’s 
favour.  In Scenario C, direct competition will only arise under similar but even tighter conditions, 
shown in section 5.3, on 𝛼 being low and the retailer restraining how high it can set s without 
triggering the NB producer preferring to avoid direct competition and instead opt for its secure 
profit by pricing just to serve Loyals. 
There is, though, an important difference between these two cases.  For the Scenario A case, it is 
the NB producer which prefers direct competition and the retailer is unable to ward off 
competition for Switchers because the SB quality is too low to support a credible threat of profit-
destroying competition.  For the Scenario C case, it is the retailer which prefers direct competition 
and it has to soften its position to strategically accommodate competition by deliberately limiting 
the SB quality. 
From the consumers’ perspective, it is the intense competition under the former case, i.e. with 
Scenario A, which is the more attractive prospect, as here direct competition for Switchers is 
about two independent firms competing head-to-head, with each setting the retail price of its own 
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product and not considering each other’s profit situation, i.e. pure horizontal competition in the 
sense of not internalising the externality effects arising from independent decision making in 
competing over the same set of customers.38  In contrast, in the latter case, under Scenario C, the 
benefits from direct competition largely flow to the retailer because competition here is really 
about vertical competition and the NB wholesale price level, where the more closely the retailer 
can imitate the NB’s quality then the greater its bargaining leverage to ensure that the NB 
producer has to set a low wholesale price.  Horizontal competition over retail prices is absent 
because it is the retailer which sets both the SB and NB prices to maximise its own combined 
profits on the sales of the SB and NB (i.e. akin to acting as an in-store cartel).   It is only by the 
indirect means through how it sets the wholesale price that the NB producer can influence (but 
not dictate) the NB retail price.  So, if it wants the NB to be more price competitive with the SB 
then it has to concede on the wholesale price as this is the only mechanism by which it can 
encourage the retailer to reduce the NB price and so close the price gap with the SB and thereby 
gain additional sales.  The upshot is that while the vertical competition delivers lower supply 
prices for the retailer, it does not necessarily mean that these benefits are passed on to consumers 
in the form of lower retail prices when the retailer opts to maintain a high retail price while 
widening its own profit margin and pocketing higher profits in the process. 
Put another way, this case under Scenario C represents the extreme form of the double-agency 
problem facing the NB producer, where it has to contend with a retailer-created “competitor” in 
the SB, which is striving to match the NB’s quality to make it a perfect substitute (in the eyes of 
Switchers), and yet has to deal with a “customer” which (from a joint standpoint because of 
double marginalisation) “over-prices” the NB and so chokes off demand to the detriment of both 
the NB producer and consumers.39   
In contrast, the direct horizontal competition and independent retail price setting in the Scenario 
A case means the NB producer does not have to contend with the vertical control aspect of the 
retailer as a strategic customer, and instead only has to deal with a horizontal competitor in the 
form of the SB as a rival product, where price competition intensifies the closer is the SB to the 
NB’s quality and which directly benefits all consumers.  Thus being in a position where it sets, 
                                                          
38 In effect, it is as if the retailer is a platform operating as a marketplace where it sells its own goods (SBs) 
but also through which other suppliers can sell their own goods (NBs) and set their own prices to compete 
with the retailer, i.e. analogous to online marketplaces like Amazon Marketplace.   
39 For further discussion and indicative evidence that retailers might over-price NBs to favour SBs, see Kim 
and Parker (1999), Soberman and Parker (2004; 2006) and Meza and Sudhir (2010).  
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rather than the retailer sets, the NB price not only ensures the NB producer earns more profit 
(which can be readily seen from Table 4 that 𝜋𝑁
𝐴𝐷 > 𝜋𝑁
𝐶𝐷for any given value of 𝑠 < 1) but makes 
sure the SB also has to compete squarely and on non-favoured terms.  In this regard, direct NB/SB 
competition with independent retail price setting ensures that competition is on a more even keel 
and both the NB producer and retailer stand to lose out the less differentiated and so more 
substitutable are their products – which is what we would expect of competition but does not 
arise if the retailer controls both SB and NB retail prices. 
In this context, the NB producer’s control of its own product’s retail price through (maximum) 
RPM in Scenario A stands to benefit both itself and consumers.  Here, RPM serves two roles in 
keeping prices down since not only does it eliminate the double marginalisation problem by 
avoiding inefficient successive mark-ups, but it is the vehicle which ensures independent retail 
price setting that drives genuine head-to-head competition.  The benefits of brand producer-led 
RPM to compete with store brands have been pointed out previously (most forcefully by Olbrich 
et al (2005; 2009) and Kuipers (2009)) but competition authorities remain suspicious of RPM as 
a competition-reducing device that weakens overall price competition.40  The key qualification 
here is that our findings relate to a single dominant retailer where there is no intrabrand 
competition, so RPM is in effect a surrogate to vigorous retail competition in suppressing the NB 
price and thus might not be so essential in highly competitive and fragmented retail markets. 
 
6.4 Implications for regulators and policymakers 
The discussion in the two preceding sub-sections raises two important issues for public policy.  
Firstly, the appropriate scope for protecting intellectual property (“IP”) rights on producer 
branded goods when faced by the challenge of copycat store brands. Secondly, the extent to which 
producers should be able to influence or control how their brands are priced and marketed by 
retailers to best ensure fair and effective competition with store brands.   
For the former, it will be important for policymakers to strike the right balance in affording IP 
protection that does not create barriers to effective competition but is sufficient to stop 
intentional parasitic copying that either fuels an otherwise unnecessary product development 
                                                          
40  However, attitudes may be softening with greater recognition of the efficiency benefits of RPM, e.g. OECD 
(2008).  Nevertheless, competition concerns remains about RPM, especially in fragmented retail markets, 
and its potential harm to both interbrand and intrabrand competition, e.g. Shaffer (2013). 
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arms race with spiralling costs that are ultimately borne by consumers or discourages brand 
investment leading ultimately to less innovation, poorer quality products and category demand 
not being fully realised, i.e. a market distortion through either economically wasteful over-
investment or economically damaging under-investment.  Given the increasing body of evidence 
on consumer confusion and consumers being misled by copycat brands,41 it would appear that 
present policy might not be offering a suitable level of protection.    
For the latter, as our analysis shows, competition can be more effective when a brand producer 
is allowed to control or at least cap the retail price of its own product to meet the store brand 
challenge.  Given the level of concentration, scale, sophistication and channel power present in 
modern retailing, it would seem that the old arguments about prohibiting RPM might be less 
important today.  Increasingly, competition authorities are applying a rule-of-reason approach to 
RPM (e.g. OECD 2008), and our analysis (subject to the above noted caveats) lends support to this 
perspective, at least in respect of maximum RPM when it can help limit excessive prices to the 
benefit of consumers.  
Nevertheless, these are not the only policy matters raised by our analysis that might have a 
bearing for regulators and competition authorities.  In one sense, it is almost taken as axiomatic 
by such bodies that competition and choice is good.   However, our analysis shows a situation 
where this is not the case, when consumers would actually be better off without the option of a 
store brand (i.e. when the NB no longer serves Switchers).  This provides pause for thought about 
differences in “good” and “bad” competition in terms of meeting consumers’ needs (e.g. Stucke 
2013).  In our case, this arose when introducing choice led to higher overall prices, because using 
two products in tandem rather than just selling one permitted more effective consumer surplus 
extraction.  In short, regulators and policymakers should not blindly fall into the trap in thinking 
that the presence of store brands is necessarily in consumers’ interests, but instead they should 
take a more considered assessment of the role of store brands and how they interact with national 
brands.  Generally, more choice will be better for consumers, but not always.  
One interesting aspect for any economic assessment is to consider whether store brands “expand” 
or simply “extend” consumer demand.  If all store brands do is mimic national brands with a “me 
too” approach then all they can really achieve is to “extend” demand by serving additional 
                                                          
41 For a summary of the empirical evidence, see Johnson et al (2013).  Experimental evidence also points to 
copycat branding causing confusion, e.g. Miceli and Pieters (2010), van Horen and Pieters (2012; 2013), 
Satomura et al (2014) and Falkowski et al (2014).  
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marginal customers, e.g. bringing in more price-conscious consumers prepared to buy a cheaper 
alternative to the NB.  This is what characterises our analysis, and as we show the net outcome of 
whether or not choice benefits consumers can go either way depending on the model’s 
parameters.  If, alternatively, store brands are fundamentally different propositions in character 
serving consumers’ needs of the product in different ways, such as  offering distinctive, novel and 
valuable features, then they can “expand” demand by attracting new consumers or re-ordering 
consumers’ product preferences (e.g. where store brands offer different combinations of features 
that are not currently offered by national brands).  This is more likely to be the case with 
“premium” store brands staking out a differentiated position – i.e. what fundamentally 
characterises national brands – and these can genuinely add to the choice set for all consumers 
rather than using me-too store brands to segment consumers by their type with illusory choice 
via carefully managed price targeting.  Yet, even for store brands that extend rather than expand 
demand in this way, they too can offer significant economic benefits when demand is substantially 
extended.  A good example is how the development (or at least re-emergence) of “budget” and 
“economy” private labels has provided a genuinely different proposition in the marketplace, 
serving extremely price-conscious (e.g. low-income) consumers that otherwise would not be well 
served. 
6.5 Implications for competition authorities defining markets 
All of this discussion, though, highlights a more fundamental issue posed by the title of the paper 
about how national brands and store brands compete.  For competition authorities, they might 
be more interested in the binary question: “Do they compete?”  Industry participants and most 
observers would take this as given, appreciating how store brands pose both a vertical and 
horizontal competition challenge to national brands.  However, at issue for a competition 
authority should be whether they compete “effectively”, in delivering economically beneficial 
effects, such as lower prices, better quality, more choice or variety, more innovation and greater 
productive and overall efficiency.   Even in our simple model we can see there may be trade-offs 
at play, such as more choice but higher overall prices.  Moreover, the equilibrium market 
configurations in our set-up generally point to the store brand mimicking national brand quality, 
resulting in targeted pricing and consumer segmentation.  While this might not necessarily leave 
consumers worse off than in the absence of a store brand, it does not fit with the common 
perception (perhaps which the industry would like to promote) of national brands and store 
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brands confronting each other head-on in the marketplace and falling over themselves in 
vigorously fighting over the same set of consumers to serve all their needs. 
Of course, the problem with this notion is a failure to appreciate the nexus of vertical and 
horizontal competition and the fact that it is the retailer that typically has total control over both 
retail pricing and the relative market positioning of the different product types (because it adjusts 
SB quality relative to fixed NB quality).  In these circumstances, as we have seen, direct head-to-
head competition for the same type of consumers only arises in limited circumstances, typically 
when there are relatively few brand loyal consumers and store brand quality cannot match 
national brand quality.   Thus, there is an irony.  The less differentiated are the two types of 
products (i.e. the closer they are to being perfect substitutes, at least for Switchers) – which we 
would normally associate with more intense price competition – then the less likely they are to 
compete head-on for the same type of consumers and price closely.  Indeed, as witnessed in our 
model, the price gap can be very wide even for nominally identical products in quality terms. 
Nevertheless, we need to be cautious here.  These findings are from a model with a stripped-down 
market structure that excludes consideration of interbrand competition between different NB 
producers and intrabrand competition between different retailers selling the same NB as well as 
offering their own SBs.   The absence of the latter is perhaps the more important, since the ability 
to use indirect price discrimination and consumer segmentation is likely to be checked if all 
consumer types have a willingness to shop-around for the best prices.  Even so, retail competition 
does not guarantee this, especially if consumers are store loyal (and naturally retailers put in a 
great deal of effort to ensure this), and when store loyalty is aided by consumer familiarity with 
retailer-unique SBs (e.g. Corstjens and Lal 2000).42   
                                                          
42 One potentially interesting extension of our model would be to have two retailers selling the NB and 
allow the brand loyal customers to choose between these two retailers, also with each retailer offering its 
own unique store brand.  This could then allow for consideration of intrabrand competition for consumers 
choosing from which retailer to buy the NB but also allow for instore-interbrand competition between the 
NB and a SB. For instance, one could consider re-naming Loyals as “Brand-Loyal-Store-Switchers” (“BLSS”) 
and Switchers as “Store-Loyal-Brand-Switchers” (“SLBS”), and then allow horizontal differentiation 
between the retailers (say, located at end points on a Hotelling line along which BLSS consumers are 
uniformly distributed and incur a transportation or disutility cost to visit either retailer depending on their 
address) and vertical differentiation between the NB and each SB (using the same Switcher demand 
characterisation as here).  This could be a sufficiently tractable model, especially as it eschews the 
complicating issue of interstore-interbrand competition, i.e. direct SB rivalry between retailers, and so it 
might provide some illuminating insights on how the relative strength of brand and store loyalty and the 
degree of product and retailer substitutability play out. 
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Speculating further, the other aspect to bear in mind with retail competition is that what might 
be a preference for one retailer to use targeted segmentation could be shared by all other retailers.  
The upshot might be then that they all use targeted segmentation to a degree but they compete 
separately for the different types of consumers.  We might then expect to see item-by-item retail 
price competition, so that while retailers seek to match each other on the price of the same 
national brand and on the price of each other’s equivalent store brand, there might be no or little 
pricing relationship between the two different products.43 
In relation to retail prices then we should not be surprised to see a wide price gap between NBs 
their equivalent SBs, and wider than might be expected given apparently narrow quality 
differences.  This is indeed borne out in numerous empirical studies.44  We should also not be 
surprised to find a lack of a strong price correlation between NBs and SBs, as their respective 
prices are more likely to track each other across stores than across products in the same product 
category if price changes are more driven by tactical changes around brand demand (e.g. 
temporary price promotions) and retailer competition (e.g. price matching promises) than shared 
cost changes (e.g. as might be experienced in an inflationary period with significant cost increase 
to the products’ ingredients).  However, this does not mean that NBs and SBs are not in 
competition with other, only that item-by-item retail price competition is likely to be a more 
dominant explanation for observed price correlations given that it is the retailers – and not the 
individual NB and SB producers – which are the ones setting retail prices for their entire product 
range and assortment. 
This highlights a problem for competition authorities in terms of the empirical toolkit which they 
usually employ to assess the degree to which products are competing with other.  Normally, 
examining the price gap and price correlations between different products can be quite telling 
about how they relate to each.  Indeed, this might be a first step in market definition for consumer 
products before applying more sophisticated econometrics with Granger-causality tests, 
cointegration analysis, demand elasticity estimation and structural equation modelling, usually 
                                                          
43  Indeed, the kinds of price matching promises (which are for price comparisons on matching items) 
witnessed in the UK lend themselves to this type of item-by-item competition (Which? 2013). For empirical 
evidence on the nature and outcomes of such competition, see Chakraborty et al (2011).  Also, theoretical 
models of bilateral oligopoly (say, with two retailers both selling the products of two producers) also show 
such item-by-item competition because each retailer internalises the externality effects from the products it 
sells but cannot (in the absence of a retail cartel) exercise any control over how a rival retailer would 
independently price its own matching products (e.g. Dobson and Waterson 2007).   
44 For example, see reviews by Pauwels and Srinivasan (2009) and Sethuraman and Raju (2012) and a 
multi-country study by Steenkamp et al (2010). 
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relying on supermarket scanner or household panel data for prices and quantities.45  The problem 
with all such analysis relying on retail prices and retail sales is that it is only directly 
representative of the nature and extent of retail competition and not the nature and extent of 
underlying producer competition.  This is because it is the retailers which are setting the retail 
prices that consumers pay, so any interpretation of how this relates to producer competition must 
necessarily only be indirect as it is one stage removed.  This might work fine when retailers are 
all perfectly competitive and are simply passive and non-strategic agents distributing producers’ 
goods at the prices at which they are instructed by producers.  However, this does not match the 
reality of modern mass retailing, where large retailers wield enormous power and influence over 
supply chains and are very strategic in nature, including controlling the development and 
positioning of store brands.   
So, to maintain some justification for continuing to use retail data for product market definition 
purposes, competition authorities are often forced into making assumptions about the nature of 
vertical competition in order to interpret what retail data says about producer competition.  
Despite the application of increasingly sophisticated econometrics, this is necessarily quite a 
subjective task (and so with plenty of scope for debate and argument) and rarely is it sufficiently 
nuanced to cater for the distorting effect of real-world retail competition and how this varies from 
one product category to another, from one time period to another, and from one retailer type to 
another.  It lends itself to a rough-and-ready approach, seduced by the availability of bountiful 
and reliable retail sales data.  However, this does not necessarily reflect or attain a true 
understanding of producer competition, which is one stage up the supply chain where it is the 
retailer – and not final consumers – that is the customer, and it is here where competition 
authorities should be focusing their interest on price competition. If competition authorities want 
to analyse producer competitor then they should not be relying on retail price and retail sales 
data but instead at the wholesale level.  Even so, pricing analysis is difficult at this supplier-
retailer interface level not just because of the lack of ready-to-hand publicly available data, but 
because of the complicated structure of supply prices which are rarely a single fixed wholesale 
price – which we used in our model for convenience and tractability.  Supply prices are more 
likely to be in the form of negotiated price schedules with different elements covering sales 
incentives and lump sum payments (such as for shelf-space fees), with these pricing structures 
                                                          
45 For a wealth of US and European examples, with details on the empirical techniques applied and findings 
in market definition cases involving brands and private labels, see Schmidt and Calvani (2009), Bishop and 
Walker (2010), and Doyle and Murgatroyd (2011).   
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varying quite significantly according to retailer preferences and how they go about their 
negotiations with individual suppliers, which can differ greatly if they are national brand or store 
brand suppliers (e.g. Competition Commission 2000; 2008).   
Yet, the bigger issue here is the reliance by competition authorities on what they see (rightly or 
wrongly) as easily-measurable price competition and then using this to define product markets 
and determine whether or not national brands and store brands are constraining each other as 
competitors.  This misses or underscores the very considerable importance and effort made in 
respect of non-price competition, and indeed the mix and interaction of the two, which has been 
the theme of our analysis.  To an extent the prices paid by consumers are reflective of non-price 
efforts made in terms of product design and quality along with marketing support because these 
involve costs that necessarily need to be covered and reflect differentiation.  However, the prices 
seen in markets are only one part of the picture.  They are attached to the goods that are in the 
market, not the goods that are not in the market, i.e. which are yet to be developed (i.e. future 
goods), have been supplanted (i.e. past goods) or available but not sold (i.e. current goods denied 
access to the market).   
As we have seen in our model, the availability of products is a discrete (yes/no) choice over which 
retailers have a very considerable influence because not only can they determine whether or not 
to allow a product to be sold in their stores (i.e. their gatekeeper role) but they can – through 
store brands – also commission and introduce products to the design and specification of their 
own choosing.  Moreover, once in the store, then it is left to the retailer to influence and ultimately 
determine what consumers buy through the in-store marketing levers that it controls, i.e. 
deciding on product assortment, product placement, product pricing, and product promotion.   
Indeed, we have talked about the double-agent role that the retailer plays towards the NB 
producer, but in reality it holds a triple-agent role (Dobson 2005).  This is because the retailer 
serves not just as the NB producer’s “customer” (buying and then reselling the NB to consumers) 
and as “competitor” (offering SBs to compete with NBs), but also as its “supplier” in selling it 
access to its stores and its shelf space either directly through listing and slotting fees or indirectly 
through the discounts and promotional support required by the retailer.46 
                                                          
46  See Kuipers (2009) for a general discussion of the shelf-space supplier role of retailers and particularly 
how retailers can use informational asymmetry to their advantage.  For formal modelling of the NB/SB 
interaction where the NB producer can buy retail shelf-space, see Amrouche and Zaccour (2007; 2009). 
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While competition authorities might accept that powerful retailers can exert socially benign 
countervailing bargaining power against powerful producers, they perhaps do not give full 
recognition to their influence over producer competition in making or breaking product success, 
artfully playing off suppliers against each other, and determining the product choices on offer to 
consumers.  Of course, consumers cannot be forced to make purchases they do not want and they 
can vote with their feet by opting not to buy or shop elsewhere, but competition authorities 
should be under no illusion just how influential powerful retailers are in terms of the choices and 
prices made to – and indeed how they are shrewdly presented to – consumers and this in turn 
gives them a huge degree of control and leverage over producers.   No powerful retailer will 
subject itself to a lack of product choice.  If needed, it will create choice – even if none is presently 
there – by one means or another. 
So, to come back to the question that a competition authority might ask in trying to decide 
whether national brands and store brands are in the same relevant market, standard empirical 
techniques relying on retailer-level price and quantity data might give misleading indications and 
should be used with considerable caution, preferably informed and responsive to a very detailed 
understanding of vertical relationships in the sector.  Yet better still, authorities need to assess 
how retailers are shaping producer competition and particularly non-price competition in the 
marketplace, understanding how choice facing consumers is fashioned and presented.  Too often 
non-price competition is given scant consideration.  It is non-price competition which gives 
consumers products in the first place, determines their features, drives quality improvement, 
leads to innovation, and creates desire.  How far NBs and SBs push each other in these dimensions 
matters greatly in determining whether or not they are competitors. In such markets, authorities 
and courts should avoid blind reliance on the hypothetical monopolist test (also known as the 
“SSNIP test” or “5-10% test”, e.g. Bishop and Walker 2010).47  
                                                          
47 Here we concur with the articulate reasoning of Robert Steiner (2002, p.22) who stated: 
“The object of delineating the relevant product market is to identify the group of firms that are close 
competitors. In my view, firms that can take significant market shares from each other are close 
competitors and are so considered by firm managements. The focus should therefore be on the ability 
to gain market share rather than the means by which the gain is attained. 
However, in the Merger Guidelines the relevant product market is determined by whether a 
monopolist over the category could profitably sustain a roughly 5% price increase. But we have seen 
that NB/PL competition also has non-price dimensions. Private labels seem more likely to gain market 
share by improving their quality and obtaining more prominent shelf space than by price cutting. I can 
envision rather frequent instances in which PLs had consistently been gaining market share, yet by the 
“5% test” only the NBs would be included in the relevant product market.” 
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With the development of evermore sophisticated econometrics techniques and the availability of 
bountiful retail sales data, there is a great temptation to rely on statistical analysis to define which 
products and firms are effective competitors to each other and which are not.  Sometimes, though, 
even simple inspection of market shares can be quite telling, such as providing clear evidence of 
store brands increasing their category share or these shares being volatile over time, implying 
swaying competitive fortunes.  This has certainly applied in many countries which have seen a 
rapid growth in store brands over recent years as retailers expanded their private label portfolios 
across different product categories and also at different levels, especially with the development 
of multi-tier store branding and sub-branding (e.g. “budget”, “standard”, “premium”, “super-
premium”, “healthy”, “organic”, etc).   
Yet, in some countries, like the UK, store brands in aggregate share terms seem to have plateaued 
at somewhere below the 50% mark as an average across CPG categories as well as being relative 
stable across individual product categories.48  Clearly, though, this maturing of store brand share 
should not be taken to infer an absence of competition between store brands and national brands, 
and indeed perhaps just the opposite as they battle to maintain their respective shares.  Moreover, 
as retailers become more adept at managing and extending their store brand portfolios, and 
enhancing their retail brand reputation and image in the process, then fewer product categories 
will be beyond their means and wherewithal to target with SBs.  In this way, barriers to entry and 
mobility for SBs will likely weaken as retailers gain experience, reputation and learning from 
success in other categories which can help them not only target new categories but also new 
consumer segments, notably more quality-conscious consumers that brings them even more into 
direct competition with NBs over exactly the same set of consumers.   In particular, this is the 
very obvious further threat posed to NBs by the emergence of premium private labels and so-
called retailer-exclusive “venture brands”.49 
Competition between national brands and store brands is then much deeper and more involved 
than simply about pricing and positioning of products serving the same consumer needs.  Yet, 
market definition testing often looks at competition more narrowly, even to the extent of 
                                                          
48  For some international comparisons, see 
http://www.fdin.org.uk/output/Brands%2014/Kantar%20-%20Private%20label%20whos%20up%20t
o%20what%20why%20present%20and%20future.pdf 
49 Tesco led the development of venture brands in the UK but these occur in other countries as well; see 
http://www.threshinfo.com/downloads/Should%20Manufacturers%20Fear%20Venture%20Brands.pdf 
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questioning whether store brands are in the same economic market as national brands when they 
are “functionally” the same (i.e. same features, same purpose and same performance). 
So, as a final thought exercise, let us return to considering our highly stylised analytical model 
and the equilibrium outcomes we find. The set-up has a fundamental demand asymmetry: all 
consumers are interested in buying the NB (at the right price), but only Switchers are interested 
in buying the SB.  As we have shown, in the equilibrium outcomes generally the NB does end up 
just serving the Loyals, i.e. it “monopolises” them, leaving the SB to “monopolise” Switchers.  Are 
the NB and SB in separate markets?  Surely, with such a simple setting this should be easy to 
answer?   
At face value it would appear that they do not compete for the same set of final consumers – but 
of course they do compete to supply the same retailer – because the outcome (not necessarily 
every party’s intention) is complete market segmentation, and of course there is a big price gap 
in their equilibrium prices.  Now, if it were in a real-world setting, we clearly could not apply the 
hypothetical monopolist test by observing their actual pricing behaviour because they are already 
“monopolists” for their customer segment, i.e. we would come up against the co-called cellophane 
fallacy.  However, it is evident from our model that monopolising Loyals is profitable to the NB, 
and indeed that represents its “secure” (fall-back) profit because it is unchallenged for these 
consumers.  But, of course, the NB producer is not targeting these particular consumers with one 
product (say a “premium NB”) and then using a different product (say a “standard NB”) to target 
the other consumers (i.e. Switchers). Rather, it is interested in serving both consumer segments 
with its one branded product. Also it is the retailer’s introduction of the SB and control of prices 
that leads to segmentation. 
At stake here is a problem reminiscent of what has been termed the “toothless fallacy”, named 
after the United Brands EC decision,50 suggesting that in the absence of direct (third-degree) price 
discrimination (i.e. with separate prices for different segments with the same product) that it is 
better to focus product market definition at the product level rather than the consumer segment 
level.51  Certainly the product category is worth monopolising and so is each consumer segment, 
                                                          
50 Case 27/76 United Brands and Co. and United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978] E.C.R. 207; 
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R 429 
51 As Bishop and Walker (2010, p.134) explain: ‘In this decision, the [European] Commission argued that 
bananas formed a separate relevant market because the very young and very old (i.e. those without teeth) 
did not consider other fruit a substitute for bananas.  However, the fact that there is a captive group of 
consumers for whom there are no substitute products available is not enough to define the relevant market.  
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but ultimately the market definition question is about whether the NB and SB are just two broadly 
substitutable versions of what is essentially the same product (i.e. the one which defines the 
product category) or whether they are separate and distinct products appealing to fundamentally 
different consumers (which is not really the case here, despite the asymmetric demand and the 
market segmentation equilibrium outcomes).  
In practice, competition authorities face far more complicated market structures and demand 
structures than are modelled here.  Consumer segments are likely to be much more blurred in 
regard of willingness to pay and willingness to switch, whether to alternative products or to 
alternative stores.  Degrees of brand loyalty and store loyalty are much more likely to be on a 
spectrum rather than in the distinct “love/hate” form here.  Consumers are much more likely to 
think about substituting across product categories (outside of buying essential goods), especially 
when so many CPG purchases are unplanned and made on impulse. All of these features make the 
task of market definition in CPG markets quite challenging and it is not surprising that there are 
many disputed decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
The important question in United Brands was not “will the toothless switch to other fruit in response to a 
rise in the price of bananas”, but “will enough consumers switch to other fruit in response to a rise in the 
price of bananas to make that price rise unprofitable”.’ 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have sought to encapsulate the essence of competition between national brands 
and store brands by focusing on the trading relationship and market behaviour of a single leading 
brand producer and a single leading retailer in a given CPG product category. There is an inherent 
tension in this essentially vertical relationship because it is one that necessarily involves both 
cooperation and competition: the former to ensure products are made and sold to final 
consumers and so profit is generated and the latter in regard to how that profit is shared and 
distributed within the channel.   The presence of a retailer-commissioned store brand only 
exacerbates that tension because it adds a horizontal dimension to this trading relationship, 
where the brand producer then faces a direct competitor at the same level of the supply chain.  In 
this way, the retailer becomes both a customer and a competitor for the brand producer, and so 
holds a double-agent role where it will naturally act in its own interest rather than any joint 
interest.  This presents a problem for the national brand producer when it only has an indirect 
means of influencing consumers’ purchasing decisions compared to the very direct means which 
the retailer can avail itself through its control of the retail selling environment and the in-store 
marketing levers at its disposal, especially when it unilaterally sets all its retail prices. 
Within this setting, we consider both price and non-price competition between these firms.  Price 
competition relates to how both wholesale (i.e. supply or factory) and retail (i.e. consumer) prices 
are set.  Non-price competition is modelled in respect of product quality and specifically how 
closely or distantly the store brand’s quality is positioned relative to that of the national brand.  
We examine the interaction of this combination of price and non-price competition for different 
scenarios regarding the means by which prices are set and who has channel control (contrasting 
brand producer-led, retailer-led and more evenly balanced channels). 
We find the outcome of such vertical and horizontal competition is that the retailer will generally 
seek to position its store brand as closely as possible to that of the national brand and then seek 
to use price differentiation to segment consumers by setting a wide price gap.  In this way, the 
national brand only sells to brand loyal consumers and the store brand sells to the remaining 
consumers who are prepared to switch products and choose the one that offers them the best 
value for money in terms of the combination of quality and price.   There are exceptions, notably 
when the retailer is very much constrained in how far store brand quality can go towards 
matching national brand quality and also if brand loyal consumers are few and brand switchers 
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are numerous and so the national brand is eager to expand its customer base and prepared to 
fight vigorously on price.  However, we find that the indirect price discrimination and market 
segmentation outcome generally prevails for most market conditions considered.  
These results then lead on to consideration of the impact on the industry participants and the 
consumers served and the implications for regulators, policymakers and competition authorities 
that oversee the sector and would wish to promote welfare-enhancing competition.   
Within the industry, the availability of a quality-equivalent store brand provides the retailer with 
bargaining leverage to reduce the wholesale price of the national brand or as a means to 
substitute low margin national brand sales for high margin store brand sales.  This can benefit 
consumers if it alleviates double marginalisation from successive producer-then-retailer mark-
ups or delivers lower prices and better value.  For the national brand producer, though, beyond 
the prospect of reduced sales and profits, it will be concerned to ensure fair competition and not 
have the retailer either free ride on its brand investments and abuse its intellectual property by 
creating an intentional lookalike store brand which could mislead or confuse consumers or abuse 
its control over the retail environment and distort retail price setting to favour store brand sales 
at the expense of those of the national brand.    
Consumers can benefit when there is healthy and vigorous competition between the national 
brand and store brand but they face the possibility of higher overall prices if the two products are 
simply used as a means for price discrimination and segmentation. Consumers are most likely to 
benefit when there is intense head-to-head price competition, which is more likely to come about 
when the products are quite differentiated and the brand producer has some control over the 
retail price of its own good and so retail prices are independently set, rather than simply 
coordinated by the retailer.   
In respect of public policy, taking a tough stance against store brand copycatting and intentional 
lookalikes could offer economic benefits in protecting intellectual property rights and helping to 
restrict free-riding behaviour which undermines and discourages brand investments. However, 
our results suggest that such a stance might offer a further benefit as well by encouraging more 
head-to-head direct price competition when the national brand and store brand are differently 
positioned in quality terms. 
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Furthermore, the prospect of intense head-to-head price competition becomes more likely the 
greater is the brand producer’s ability to have an even playing field with the retailer’s store brand 
when it comes to retail price setting.  One means to achieve this could be through maximum resale 
price maintenance (RPM), where the national brand producer sets a price cap so that the retailer 
cannot raise (but is free to lower) the national brand price above the level set to ensure that the 
price gap with the store brand is not so wide as to choke off its sales.  Competition authorities are 
wary about allowing powerful producers to use RPM, but in this setting maximum RPM could be 
effective not just in alleviating double marginalisation (which is the usual vertical restraint 
argument) but also in facilitating more independent pricing between what are supposed to be 
rival products (i.e. a horizontal competition argument). 
In addition, our findings point to the need for considerable care when undertaking market 
definition analysis in respect of CPG markets, and particularly understanding the true extent and 
nature of competition between national brands and store brands.  Reliance on simple techniques 
measuring the extent of price gaps and price correlation might give misleading indications when 
there is item-by-item retail pricing and retailers intentionally use different quality products in 
the same product category as a means to apply indirect price discrimination and segment 
consumers. Similarly, care is needed when using and interpreting demand elasticity modelling to 
make inferences about product-level competition when the competition authority uses retail 
prices set by retailers and not by producers. In particular, the extent of substitutability between 
national brands and store brands could well be underestimated, giving rise to the possibility of 
the wrong inference being drawn that they are in separate economic markets rather than the 
same market.  This is particularly important in the context of merger analysis and assessing 
market dominance where the true extent of the price and non-price competitive constraint of 
store brands on national brands might not fully understood. 
In drawing these conclusions, we are mindful that the analytical model we have developed is 
limited by its stylised nature and restrictive assumptions, even if it allows for a range of market 
conditions and different channel behaviour scenarios.  In particular, we are aware that the 
academic literature has developed an array of analytical models, often much more sophisticated 
than one here, looking at many different aspects of national brand and store brand competition.  
Taking account of the developments and gaps in the literature, we suggest five areas where 
further fruitful research might be developed, extending the framework here with insights and 
techniques from elsewhere in the literature.  First, allowing for differential production costs, 
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particularly costs associated with quality improvements, might offer interesting insights on 
whether a retailer might want to develop a multi-tier store brand portfolio, positioning each 
variant to appeal to particular consumer segments on a quality-conscious-to-price-conscious 
spectrum.  Second, introducing bargaining rather than take-it-or-leave-it contracting might 
provide further insights on how the parties might seek more complicated contracts than simply 
specifying price and quantity (e.g. covering slotting fees and non-compete/exclusivity contracts).  
Thirdly, introducing additional retailers and national brand producers would allow for a more 
extensive consideration of the interplay between intrabrand and interbrand competition, and in 
particular allow for consideration as to whether this would disrupt or further encourage retailers’ 
efforts to use national brands and store brands to segment consumers.  Fourthly, modelling 
competition as a dynamic game would allow for studying how competition evolves over time, and 
particularly the responses and counter responses in market positioning between national and 
store brands.  Fifthly, and perhaps the avenue that has been least explored so far and the one that 
has probably the greatest potential for offering fresh insights, we would suggest there is 
considerable opportunity to apply behavioural economics thinking to this setting.  For example, 
this could be to examine lookalikes and consumer confusion, mistaken purchases and the role of 
trust when consumers are neither fully rational nor fully informed and particularly prone to loss 
aversion, and how then retailers’ control over the shopping environment and consumers’ 
shopping experience affects competition. 
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